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"I Want a Black Lawyer to Represent Me":
Addressing a Black Defendant's Concerns
with Being Assigned a White Court-
Appointed Lawyer
Kenneth P. Troccoi"
"[Iln our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."
- The U.S. Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright1
'Beggars can't be choosers."
- Old adage2
Introduction
"I want a Black lawyer to represent me." These are the first
words you hear after you introduce yourself to your new client.
You have been appointed to represent this man on a criminal
charge. You are white. He is Black.3 You answer that you are an
* LL.M. 2001, Georgetown University Law Center. J.D. 1984, George Washington
University Law Center. B.A. 1981, Boston College. From mid-1992 until early
1999, the author was first an assistant public defender and then a senior assistant
public defender in the Office of the Public Defender for the City of Alexandria,
Virginia. For approximately five-and-a-half years prior to those positions, the
author practiced primarily white-collar criminal defense for law firms located in
Washington, D.C. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of
Georgetown Law Professor Charles R. Lawrence, III, for whom this Article was
originally written. The helpful comments and revisions suggested by the editors
and staff of Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice are also much
appreciated, particularly those by Outside Articles Editor, Mary K. Schug;
Managing Editor, Heather Rysgaard; and Editor-In-Chief, John H. Goolsby.
1. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
2. See Wayne D. Holly, Rethinking the Sixth Amendment for the Indigent
Criminal Defendant: Do Reimbursement Statutes Support Recognition of a Right to
Counsel of Choice for the Indigent?, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 181, 182 (1998) C'[T]he
familiar adage that 'beggars can't be choosers' has uniformly been incorporated into
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence....
3. Throughout this Article, "Black" and "African-American" are used
interchangeably, as are "white" and "Caucasian." "Black" is also capitalized
throughout to acknowledge the status of African Americans as a distinct cultural
group. See Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV.
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experienced criminal lawyer and will represent him to the best of
your ability, regardless of his or your race. He responds that he
too is experienced with the criminal justice system-a system that
targets Black men, like himself, for prosecution far more than
whites, that sentences Black men to prison more frequently and
for a longer duration than whites, and that fails to acknowledge or
address the role that race and racism play in the development,
enforcement, and execution of the criminal laws established by
"the system." You explain that the law does not allow the client,
as an indigent, to choose his own lawyer. 'You can hire whomever
you want to handle your case," you say, "if you have the financial
ability to do so. Otherwise, the court chooses your lawyer for you,
and there is little you can do about it, other than to decide to
represent yourself."
Your client is not satisfied with this response. He explains
that an African-American lawyer will be better able to understand
and appreciate the circumstances that resulted in the bringing of
these charges and that he, the client, can trust a Black lawyer
more than a white one. You agree that trust is indispensable to an
effective attorney-client relationship, but you disagree that trust is
unobtainable merely because you are white, and that you, as a
white lawyer, cannot be as effective as a lawyer who is African-
American. Sensing that you and your client have reached an
impasse, you suggest that both of you give this matter more
thought and discuss it further at your next meeting. Your client
assents and you leave.
Under the federal Constitution, an indigent criminal
defendant has a right to appointed counsel to represent him in his
criminal case. 4 Typically, such a defendant has little or no say in
who that lawyer will be. If the appointed lawyer is of a different
race than the defendant, the latter may worry that the lawyer will
be unable to understand or fully appreciate his circumstances. He
may worry that the lawyer's judgment and advice cannot be
1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) (stating her view that "[w]hen using 'Black,' I shall use an
upper-case 'B' to reflect my view that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other
'minorities,' constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as
a proper noun"). Further, the use of masculine pronouns throughout this Article,
when feminine pronouns could just as well apply, is merely the stylistic preference
of the author.
4. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV, § 1; see also Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345
(holding that an indigent criminal defendant in state court is constitutionally
entitled to court-appointed counsel at his trial).
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trusted. He may worry that his relationship with the lawyer will
be less than what it could be. In sum, he may be concerned that
the lawyer will not be able to represent him as effectively as a
lawyer whose race is the same as his.
These concerns can seriously impede the building of trust
between the attorney and client. Trust is essential to establishing
rapport 5 and is hard enough to come by in the appointed attorney-
indigent client context, even without the issue of race. 6 Trust and
rapport, in turn, enhance attorney effectiveness which,
correspondingly, promotes justice, both for the individual
defendant and the larger criminal justice system. Indeed, as the
opening quote from Gideon v. Wainwright suggests, establishing a
just and fair system is the key reason for requiring appointed
counsel in the first place.7
Yet despite the importance of trust and rapport in the
attorney-client relationship, and their impact on justice, scant
attention has been paid to the effect race has on that relationship. 8
5. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 21 n.4 (1983) (Brennan, J., and Marshall,
J., concurring in the result) ("Nothing is more fundamental to the lawyer-client
relationship than the establishment of trust and confidence.'.... 'Basic trust ... is
the cornerstone of the adversary system and effective assistance of counsel."'
(quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-3.1 cmt. (2d ed. 1980)
and Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 212 (6th Cir. 1981))); see also id. at 24 (stating
that the attorney-client relationship "'involves not just the casual assistance of a
member of the bar, but an intimate process of consultation and planning which
culminates in a state of trust and confidence between the client and his attorney"'
(citation omitted)); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Defense Function
Standard 4-3.1(a) (3d ed. 1993) ("Defense counsel should seek to establish a
relationship of trust and confidence with the accused .... ); Holly, supra note 2, at
187 C'[F]ulfillment of counsel's role as an advocate largely depends upon a basic
trust between attorney and client .. "); cf. Roland Acevedo et al., Race and
Representation: A Study of Legal Aid Attorneys and Their Perceptions of the
Significance of Race, 18 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 40 (2000) ('Communication is
probably the most important part of the attorney-client relationship. In order for
an attorney to effectively advocate for her client, she must first establish a
relationship with that client, and she must obtain the necessary information.").
6. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Defense Function Standard 4-
1.2 cmt. (3d ed. 1993). This standard observes that:
A lawyer who is privately retained generally has the confidence of the
client, who after all has made a conscious choice of counsel .... By
contrast, the lawyer who is appointed or who serves in an organized
defender office must win the confidence of the client, who usually has had
no say in the choice of an advocate.
Id.
7. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (noting that the Sixth Amendment right to
appointment of counsel is a constitutional principle "established to achieve a fair
system of justice").
8. See Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as
Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298, 1354-
55, 1354 n.154 (1992) (noting the rarity of "empirical studies of how attorneys talk
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This is remarkable considering the prevalence of cross-racial
representation. Statistics show that most criminal defendants
rely on court-appointed counsel. 9 Black defendants are more likely
than their white counterparts to need such counsel given that
people of color are poor at a higher rate than whites.10 Conversely,
the lawyers representing these Black defendants tend to be white
given the relatively small percentage of African Americans in the
legal profession. 1  Thus, the concerns of our hypothetical
defendant are likely to be widespread given that cross-racial
representation is the norm, not the exception. And whether
accurate or not, these concerns can produce the very
ineffectiveness that our defendant fears and that the system
with their clients in private" and citing one study that observed that "'[o]ne of the
reasons that data about lawyers and dispute transformation are so incomplete and
theoretical is the paucity of observational studies of lawyer-client
relationships .. " (citation omitted)); see also David A. Thomas, Racial Dynamics
in Cross-Race Developmental Relationships, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 169, 169 (1993)
("[Olrganizational research has rarely focused on the dynamics of interracial work-
centered relationships.").
9. See Holly, supra note 2, at 220 C[S]tatistics reveal that approximately
seventy-five to eighty percent of criminal defendants are indigent."); OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES: A STATUS REPORT 1 (1993) ("About
85% of criminal cases prosecuted in the federal courts require the services of court-
appointed counsel, either private attorneys or staff of federal defender
organizations."); see also Fox Butterfield, Texas Nears Creation of State Public-
Defender System, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2001, at A14 (stating that nationwide, "82
percent of defendants in felony cases are now represented by publicly financed
lawyers, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics at the Justice Department").
10. Acevedo et al., supra note 5, at 20 ("People of color continue to be poor at a
higher rate than whites."); see also id. at 29 (noting that ninety percent of the
clients in the Civil Division of New York's Legal Aid Society are people of color).
11. See id. at 29 n.119 (citing Affirmative Action on the Edge, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Feb. 13, 1995, at 35, 37 (reporting that "whites account for over
94% of all admitted attorneys")); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Underrepresentation of
Minorities in the Legal Profession" A Critical Race Theorist's Perspective, 95 MICH.
L. REV. 1005, 1008 n.7 (1997) ('According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
123,060,000 members of the civilian noninstitutional population sixteen years old
and over were employed in 1994. Of that total, 821,000 were lawyers. Only 3.3% of
the lawyers were black." (citation omitted)); see also Margaret M. Russell, Beyond
"Sellouts" and "Race Cards'" Black Attorneys and the Straitjacket of Legal Practice,
95 MICH. L. REV. 766, 767-68 (1997). Russell observes that:
[M]inority attorneys still suffer from severe underrepresentation in the
legal profession. At the beginning of this decade, Blacks, Asian
Americans, Latinos and Latinas, and Native Americans comprised only
twelve percent of the nation's law students, less than eight percent of
lawyers, eight percent of law professors, and two percent of the partners at
the nation's largest law firms. When compared with the overall
percentage of people of color in the national population-approximately
twenty-five percent-these paltry figures illustrate the extent to which
attorneys of color are still very much a token presence in the legal system.
Id. (citations omitted). When her essay appeared, Russell was Associate
Professor of Law at Santa Clara University Law School. Id. at 766 n.*.
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strives to avoid.
This Article looks at this issue in the context of an African-
American defendant and a white court-appointed lawyer.12 More
specifically, this Article describes the potential concerns an
indigent Black defendant could have when appointed a white
lawyer, the lawyer's possible responses to those concerns, and
ways those concerns may be addressed by the larger judicial
system.
As background, this Article first examines the Sixth
Amendment right to appointed counsel in a criminal case with an
emphasis on that Amendment's goal of furthering justice, both for
the individual defendant and for the entire criminal justice
system. 13 The nature and scope of the right to counsel is reviewed,
as well as how the U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to make
that right effective. 14 This review shows that the Court has
achieved mixed results in its Sixth Amendment 15 quest to see that
"justice ... 'be done."'16
Part II relates the potential concerns a Black defendant may
have about being appointed a white lawyer. These concerns are
encompassed within three arguments that separately address
issues of racism, attorney effectiveness, and the practical
difficulties in educating the white lawyer on the impact race has
on the defendant's case. 17
The white lawyer's possible responses to the Black
12. For purposes of this Article, "court-appointed lawyer" means a lawyer
appointed by the trial court and paid for by the government, and "indigent" means
that the defendant is unable to afford private counsel. For an excellent discussion
of the definitions of "indigent" under federal and state law, see Craig P. Gaumer
and Paul R. Griffith, Presumed Indigent: The Effect of Bankruptcy on a Debtor's
Sixth Amendment Right to Criminal Defense Counsel, 62 UMKC L. REV. 277, 286-
90, 294-95 (1993).
13. The focus of this Article is on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel given
that Amendment's specific applicability to criminal cases. Conversely, the
Fourteenth Amendment, which has also been interpreted as mandating a right to
appointed counsel, applies to criminal and civil cases alike. See, e.g., In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 34-41 (1967) (Due Process right to counsel in a civil juvenile
delinquency hearing); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981)
(Due Process right to counsel may exist in a civil parental status termination
hearing); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496-98 (1980) (plurality opinion) (Due
Process right to counsel for civil hearing regarding an inmate's involuntary
transfer from prison to a state mental hospital).
14. See infra notes 26-98 and accompanying text.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) ("The Sixth Amendment stands
as a constant admonition that if thd constitutional safeguards it provides be lost,
justice will not 'still be done."' (citation omitted)).
17. See infra notes 99-129 and accompanying text.
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defendant's concerns are the subject of Part III. Three broad
responses, with some variants, are identified. These responses
either deny the existence of racism, refute the relevance of the
defendant's race to the attorney-client relationship, or, conversely,
acknowledge race and racism's relevance to that relationship. 8 As
explained more fully below, this last response incorporates
elements of what is called the "Race Consciousness Model of
Lawyering," which posits that personal identifying characteristics,
such as race and ethnicity, impact attorney effectiveness and the
way that a lawyer and client relate to each other. 19
Finally, Part IV suggests three ways to ameliorate the racial
friction (and further justice in the process) that may arise in the
white appointed lawyer-Black indigent defendant relationship. 20
First, as the Race Consciousness Model recommends, greater and
better communication should be promoted between the accused
and his lawyer about the issue of race. 21 Such communication
should also take place within law schools and between other actors
in the criminal justice system, including prosecutors, judges, and
legislators. Second, courts should accord greater weight to the
importance of a meaningful attorney-client relationship and be
more receptive to appointing substitute counsel when the issue of
race impedes the development of such a relationship. 22 Finally,
the procedures for initially selecting the appointed lawyer should
be revised to give the accused the option to choose his own
counsel. 23 Alternatively, the defendant should be assigned two
alternate counsel in addition to his appointed lawyer and given
the right to substitute in one of these alternates. 24
This Article concludes with a call for all actors in the criminal
justice system to acknowledge the influence of race in the
appointed attorney-indigent client relationship and for better
education for, and communication between, these parties about
this issue. Improved race consciousness may redress our
hypothetical defendant's concerns and the powerlessness he feels
in being unable to realize Gideon's promise of justice for all.25
18. See infra 130-184 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 175-178 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 185-225 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part IV.A.
22. See infra Part IV.B.
23. See infra Part IV.C.
24. See infra Part IV.C.
25. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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I. The Federal Constitutional Right to Appointed Counsel
in Criminal Cases
It is hard to overstate the importance of the right to court-
appointed counsel to the American adversary system of criminal
justice. The goal of our system is to see that justice is done. This
goal is important for the accused, who is entitled to be treated
fairly during the course of his prosecution, and it is important for
the larger judicial system, which must ensure reliable results to
maintain credibility. For the system to work, justice must exist on
both the micro-level (for the defendant) and on the macro-level (for
the system). In interpreting the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, the Supreme Court has been mindful of these interests, as
the following summary of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence shows.
A. The Nature of the Right
The Sixth Amendment states, in pertinent part, that "[imn all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have the assistance of
counsel for his defence." 26  Initially, it was thought that this
requirement applied only to federal courts and, moreover, that it
meant merely that a criminal defendant had the right to employ a
lawyer to assist in his defense. 27
It was not until 1932 that this view began to change and "the
language of the Sixth Amendment [began expanding] well beyond
its obvious meaning." 28  The change started with the Supreme
26. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
27. JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS,
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789-1995, at 277 (1996)
C'Originally, [the Sixth Amendment right to counsel] was interpreted merely to
guarantee that an individual had the right to employ an attorney."); 3 DAVID S.
RUDSTEIN ET AL., CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 13-2 (1990 & Supp. 2000)
('Congress enacted two statutory provisions [around the time the Sixth
Amendment was adopted] suggesting that this guarantee might be limited to a
right to retained counsel."); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979)
C'There is considerable doubt that the Sixth Amendment itself, as originally
drafted by the Framers of the Bill of Rights, contemplated any guarantee other
than the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution in a federal court to employ a
lawyer to assist in his defense." (citation omitted)).
28. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 (1994) (stating that by 1979, the
Court "had already expanded the language of the Sixth Amendment well beyond its
obvious meaning"); see also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION 1430 (Johnny H. Killian & George A. Costello eds., 1996). The
Congressional Research Service has explained that:
Contemporaneously with the proposal and ratification of the Sixth
Amendment, Congress enacted two statutory provisions which seemed to
indicate an understanding that the [Sixth Amendment guarantee of the
assistance of counsel] was limited to assuring that a person wishing and
Law and Inequality
Court's decision in Powell v. Alabama,29 in which the Court, for
the first time, interpreted the U.S. Constitution, and specifically
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, 30  to require the
appointment of counsel in certain circumstances. 31
Powell v. Alabama, otherwise known as the "Scottsboro Boys
Case," concerned nine Black youths, including Ozie Powell, who
were charged with raping two white girls in 1931 on a freight train
while traveling near Scottsboro, Alabama.3 2 The girls were with a
group of white boys who, with one exception, were thrown from the
train during an altercation with the Black youths. 33 The suspects
were arrested the same day, before the train reached Scottsboro,
where a mob had formed.34 At or before the arraignment six days
later, the trial judge appointed "all the members of the [local] bar"
to represent the defendants. 35 However, at the trials held on April
6, 1931 (a mere six days after the arraignment), no one definitively
stepped forward to take responsibility for the defense of the boys.3 6
In four separate one-day trials, eight of the boys were found guilty
and sentenced to death.37 All but one of the convictions were
affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court. 38
able to afford counsel would not be denied that right. It was not until the
1930s that the Supreme Court began expanding the Clause to its present
scope.
Id.
29. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits a state from depriving any person of "life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." Id. at § 1.
31. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71-72; see also 2 CHESTER J. ANTIEAU & WILLIAM J.
RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 521 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that prior to
Powell, "there was no right to an appointed counsel in an indigent case"); RUDSTEIN
ET AL., supra note 27, at 13-2 (stating that Powell was "(tihe first Supreme Court
case to address the right of an indigent to appointed counsel"); Brian L.
McDermott, Defending the Defenseless: Murray v. Giarratano and the Right to
Counsel in Capital Postconviction Proceedings, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1305, 1309 (1990)
('The Court in Powell v. Alabama first established the right to counsel .... ").
32. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 49-51; see also id. at 74 (Butler, J., dissenting)
(describing the four trials in which the nine youths were tried).
33. See id. at 50-51.
34. See id. at 51 (noting that the defendants were "met at Scottsboro by a large
crowd. It does not sufficiently appear that the defendants were seriously
threatened with, or that they were actually in danger of, mob violence; but it does
appear that the attitude of the community was one of great hostility").
35. Id. at 49, 53.
36. See id. at 53, 56; cf. Powell v. State, 141 So. 201, 203 (Ala. 1932) (stating
that the joint trial of five of the defendants-Ozie Powell, William Roberson, Andy
Wright, Olen Montgomery, and Eugene Williams-was held on April 8, rather than
April 6, 1931), rev'd, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
37. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 50; id. at 74 (Butler, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 50; id. at 74 (Butler, J., dissenting).
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In reversing those convictions, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the Sixth Amendment requires that counsel be appointed at
state expense to assist an indigent defendant at trial.39 The Court
based its holding on that Amendment's requirement that the
accused "have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 40
Finding that "the right to have counsel appointed, when
necessary, is a logical corollary from the constitutional right to be
heard by counsel," the Court ruled that the trial court erred in
failing to appoint specific counsel to assist the defendants.4 1
Although the Sixth Amendment formed a basis for the
Court's decision in Powell, the principal rationale for that decision
rested on the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 42
Moreover, in Powell, the Court emphasized the importance of
appointed counsel to the goal of justice, calling the necessity of
such counsel an "immutable principle[] of justice which inhere[s]
in the very idea of free government."43 The Court reiterated this
point a mere six years later in Johnson v. Zerbst,44 when it wrote
that the Sixth Amendment "stands as a constant admonition that
if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not
'still be done."' 45
Johnson v. Zerbst is also significant because it more fully
explained the Sixth Amendment underpinning of the right to
appointed counsel, and it expanded that right to include all felony
prosecutions. 46 Zerbst, however, only applied to federal courts. 47
39. See id. at 71-72 (holding that where the defendant is unable to employ
counsel in a capital case, due process of law requires that counsel be assigned for
him).
40. Id. at 66 (citation omitted).
41. Id. at 72.
42. Id. at 71 ("mhe necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the
failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was... a
denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... ").
43. Id. at 71 (stating that the failure to appoint counsel under the
circumstances of that case "would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already
adverted to, 'that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in
the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may disregard"'
(quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898))).
44. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
45. Id. at 462 (citation omitted).
46. See id. at 467-68. The Court stated:
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with
[a] crime to the assistance of counsel, compliance with this
constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a
federal court's authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty. ...
If the accused.., is not represented by counsel and has not competently
and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment
stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence
depriving him of his life or liberty.
Law and Inequality
It was not until twenty-five years later that the Court, in the
seminal case of Gideon v. Wainwright,48 extended Zerbst's holding
to the states.49
In Gideon, the Supreme Court ruled that the Sixth
Amendment right to court-appointed counsel applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.50 In reaching that decision,
the Court relied not only on Powell and Zerbst, but also on "reason
and reflection [that] require us to recognize that in our adversary
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel
is provided for him."51
Gideon is also notable because it rejected the case-by-case
approach for Sixth Amendment court-appointed counsel analysis,
in which counsel is appointed only in certain circumstances after
balancing the competing interests. 52 For the first time, it adopted
a per se approach for deciding whether a criminal defendant is
entitled to appointed counsel.53 Crucial to the Court's decision was
the "obvious truth" that a fair trial cannot be assured unless
counsel is made available to a poor defendant. 54 Thus, in officially
embracing the view that under the Sixth Amendment all indigent
criminal defendants at trial are per se entitled to court-appointed
counsel, the Court once again paid heed to the overarching goal of
"achiev[ing] a fair system of justice."55
Id. The Zerbst Court was unequivocal in its holding that the Sixth Amendment
requires that an indigent federal defendant be offered appointed counsel. Id.
47. Id.
48. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
49. Id. at 344-45.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 344.
52. The case-by-case approach, exemplified by the holding in Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455 (1942), initially held sway with the Supreme Court. Betts, decided a
mere four years after Johnson v. Zerbst, held that the Sixth Amendment right to
the appointment of counsel in state prosecutions should be decided on a case-by-
case basis and was necessary only where it "seem[ed] to be required in the interest
of fairness." Id. at 471-72. In so holding, the Court affirmed Betts' pro se robbery
conviction and concluded that the appointment of counsel was "not a fundamental
right, essential to a fair trial." Id. at 471. Gideon overruled Betts, calling it "an
anachronism when handed down."' Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345 (quoting amici curiae).
53. See ANTIEAU & RICH, supra note 31, at 522 (noting that Gideon rejected the
case-by-case approach for appointing counsel in criminal cases); William L. Dick,
Jr., The Right to Appointed Counsel for Indigent Civil Litigants: The Demands of
Due Process, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627, 627-28 (1989) (stating that Gideon
adopted the per se approach for criminal cases).
54. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
55. Id. (stating that a constitutional principle behind the Sixth Amendment
right to appointed counsel is "to achieve a fair system ofjustice").
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B. The Scope of the Right
The Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel applies
only to "criminal prosecutions."5 6 More specifically, it only applies
to criminal cases in which actual imprisonment will be imposed.
57
The Supreme Court made this limitation clear in two cases after
Gideon. First, in Argersinger v. Hamlin,58 the Court clarified that
the right to appointed counsel applies to misdemeanor
prosecutions. 59 Assuring just outcomes was one of the principal
reasons for that decision. 60 In so concluding, however, the Court
left open the question of whether the right to appointed counsel
applied to cases in which the authorized penalty included
incarceration, but where no actual incarceration would be
imposed.61 That question was answered in the negative by the
second case, Scott v. Illinois, in which the authorized penalty for
defendant Aubrey Scott's crime (shoplifting) included up to one
year in jail.62 Given that Scott's actual sentence consisted of a fine
rather than jail time, the Court held that he had not been entitled
to a court-appointed lawyer. 63 "[A]ctual imprisonment [is] the line
defining the [Sixth Amendment] constitutional right to
appointment of counsel," the Court stated.64
56. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
57. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979).
58. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
59. Id. at 36-37.
60. See id. at 31 C'The assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very
existence of a fair trial ...."); see also id. at 34 (observing that even in cases that
do not go to trial, counsel is needed "so that [the accused] is treated fairly by the
prosecution").
61. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 379 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., and Stevens,
J., dissenting) (noting that "[tihe question of the right to counsel in cases in which
incarceration was authorized but would not be imposed was expressly reserved [in
Argersinger]").
62. Id. at 368.
63. See id. at 373-74.
64. Id. at 373; see also id. at 374 (finding that the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that "no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of
appointed counsel in his defense"). The holding in Scott was reaffirmed in 1994 in
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994), in which the Court held that a prior
uncounseled conviction valid under Scott can be used to enhance the sentence in a
subsequent conviction.
Recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review an Alabama
Supreme Court case that held that the right to appointed counsel is triggered
where a suspended term of incarceration is imposed conditioned on probation and
other terms. See Exparte Shelton, No. 1990031, 2000 WL 1603806, at *5 (Ala. May
19, 2000) (holding that "a defendant who receives a suspended or probated sentence
to imprisonment has a constitutional right to counsel"), cert. granted, 121 S.Ct.
1955 (May 14, 2001) (No. 00-1214). As of November 19, 2001, oral argument had
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The right to appointed counsel, moreover, extends beyond the
trial phase of the criminal case. 65 Such non-trial phases covered
by the right, known as "critical stages," include preliminary
hearings, court proceedings after formal charges have been filed,
and certain pre-indictment procedures, such as line-ups. 66 A right
to counsel also may exist after the trial.67
Extending the right to appointed counsel to non-trial phases
furthers the Sixth Amendment's aim of ensuring just procedures
and outcomes. Conversely, and as discussed more fully below, this
aim has been undermined when it comes to selecting that
counsel.68 More specifically, although the Sixth Amendment has
been interpreted to guarantee the right to court-appointed counsel,
it has not been construed to guarantee the right to a specific
lawyer. When counsel is appointed, "normally the accused will not
be heard to object to the attorney assigned."69 Indeed, "[c]ourts
generally hold that the initial selection of counsel to represent an
indigent is a matter resting within the almost absolute discretion
of the trial court."70  This means as well that an indigent
not been scheduled. See U.S. SUPREME COURT, ARGUMENT CALENDARS (OCTOBER
TERM 2001),
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oraLarguments/argument_calendars.html (last
updated Nov. 19, 2001).
65. Under the Sixth Amendment, court-appointed counsel is also required for
other non-trial phases of a criminal prosecution. See ANTIEAU & RICH, supra note
31, at 524-27 (reviewing Supreme Court cases stating that under the Sixth
Amendment, court-appointed counsel is required during non-trial phases of a
criminal prosecution). See generally RUDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 27, at 13-38
(listing some of the phases of the criminal case where the right to counsel has been
found to be constitutionally required).
66. See RUDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 27, at 13-46 (stating that the determining
factor is whether the phase of the case is a "critical stage" of the proceeding); see
also Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (stating that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel "attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial
proceedings have been initiated against [the accused]"); Coleman v. Alabama, 399
U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (at preliminary hearing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
336-37 (1967) (at post-arrest lineup); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-
06 (1964) (after formal charges have been filed). But see 2 JOSEPH G. COOK,
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 8-11 (3d ed. 1996) (stating that a right
to counsel has generally been found not to exist at the evidence-gathering stage).
67. See, e.g., Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) (at sentencing);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (at the first appeal as of right). But see
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 617-19 (1974) (finding no constitutional right to
appointed counsel to pursue discretionary appeals).
68. See infra Part IV.C.
69. COOK, supra note 67, at 8-55.
70. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 549-50 (2d ed. 1999); see
also Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense:
Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of
Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 102-03 (1993)
C'[V]irtually every American court considering the issue has held that refusal to
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defendant does not have the right to replace his appointed lawyer
with other appointed counsel of his choice. 71 Conversely, subject to
few limitations, 72 a defendant with money can hire whomever he
wants as his lawyer. 7
3
Despite the absence of input from the defendant regarding
the choice of appointed counsel, a defendant does have the
constitutional right to waive counsel altogether and represent
himself.7 4 To do so, the defendant must be competent, fully aware
of the right being waived, and informed of the "dangers and
disadvantages" of waiver. 75 Thus, the waiver must be knowing
and intelligent, a determination the trial court must make based
on the particular facts and circumstances of the case.
76
accept the indigent's choice of counsel is permissible and constitutional .). For
the reasons for allowing the trial judge to appoint counsel without input from the
defendant, see 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra, at 550-51.
71. See 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 70, at 555 (stating that an accused "has no
right to replace one appointed counsel with another even if that can be done
without causing any delay in the proceedings").
72. For example, a defendant cannot be represented by a disbarred lawyer, or
one who is not licensed to practice in the jurisdiction in which representation is
sought, or by one who has a conflict of interest. See generally Holly, supra note 2,
at 190-98 (discussing some of the reasons a court might prohibit a retained lawyer
from handling a defendant's case).
73. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (noting that a defendant who
hires counsel should have "a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice");
see also 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 70, at 557 (CWhere defendant has a Sixth
Amendment or due process right to the assistance of counsel, that constitutional
guarantee encompasses the 'right to retained counsel of his choosing' as an aspect
of his 'right to spend his own money to obtain the advice and assistance ... of
counsel."'(citation omitted)); COOK, supra note 67, at 8-46 ("The right to counsel
includes the right of the accused to select counsel subject to certain limitations.").
74. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (holding that an accused
has a constitutional right to represent himself at trial). The right to self-
representation may also be protected by statute. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1994)
C'In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own
cases personally or by counsel .... ). But cf. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal.,
528 U.S. 152, 154 (2000) (finding no constitutional right to self-representation on
appeal).
75. COOK, supra note 67, at 8-37 to 8-38 C'For the waiver to be effective, the
prosecution must show that the accused was competent to make a waiver and that
the accused was fully aware of the right being waived."); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835
(holding that before waiving counsel, the defendant must be informed of "the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation"); see also RUDSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 27, at 13-53 to 13-72 (describing the general principles that apply to waivers of
counsel); 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 70, at 574-81 (explaining in detail the
requisite warnings and judicial inquiry associated with counsel waivers).
76. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (stating that the waiver of
counsel must be intelligent and intentional and that the court should consider the
totality of the circumstances in considering a waiver request); Faretta, 422 U.S. at
835 (waiver must be knowing and intelligent); see also RUDSTEIN ET AL., supra note
27, at 13-53, 55 (noting that waiver must be competent and determined on a case-
by-case basis); COOK, supra note 67, at 8-37 to 8-41 (discussing the requirements of
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C. Making the Right Effective
Consistent with the goal of achieving justice, the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel has been interpreted to include the
right to "effective" assistance of counsel.7 7 For many years, courts
believed that the constitutional standard for effective assistance
differed depending on whether counsel was retained or
appointed.78 The Supreme Court laid that issue to rest in 1980
when it ruled in Cuyler v. Sullivan 9 that there is "no basis for
drawing a distinction between retained and appointed counsel."8 0
Four years later in Strickland v. Washington,8' the Court, for the
first time, provided a thorough analysis of what it means to be
"ineffective."82
According to Strickland, establishing ineffectiveness requires
proving that counsel's performance was deficient and that the
defense was prejudiced as a result.8 3 To establish prejudice, the
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that
the result in the case would have been different but for counsel's
an effective waiver and citing relevant cases); 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 70, at
538-39, 574-81 (discussing waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
77. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) ('It has long been
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of
counsel.").
78. See COOK, supra note 67, at 8-64 to 8-65 ('For many years, lower courts had
disagreed on whether the same constitutional standard for effective assistance of
counsel applied when counsel was appointed as when counsel was retained ....
[Indeed, some believed that] the burden of proof resting with the accused would be
greater in [cases where counsel had been retained].").
79. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
80. Id. at 344-45 ('Since the State's conduct of a criminal trial itself implicates
the State in the defendant's conviction, we see no basis for drawing a distinction
between retained and appointed counsel that would deny equal justice to
defendants who must choose their own lawyers."); see also COOK, supra note 67, at
8-65 (stating that the controversy regarding whether the effectiveness standard
was different for retained versus appointed attorneys was resolved in Cuyler v.
Sullivan).
81. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
82. Id. at 683 (noting that the case "presents a type of Sixth Amendment claim
that this Court has not previously considered in any generality"); see also 3 LAFAVE
ET AL., supra note 70, at 621 (observing that prior to Strickland, the Supreme
Court "had not sought to articulate a comprehensive conception of ineffective
assistance of counsel," and stating that Strickland focused on the Sixth
Amendment, but that the ineffectiveness standard articulated therein has
"apparent applicability as well to those stages of the process in which due process
or equal protection establish a constitutional right to counsel").
83. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ('A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's
assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction ... has two
components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient .... Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.").
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deficient performance.8 4 A reasonable probability "is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."85
In delineating a performance standard to which all attorneys
must adhere, Strickland sought to maintain an adversarial system
that was just: one that ensured fairness for the accused and
reliable results for society at large. In the Court's own words:
The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of
counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is
critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just
results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney,
whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to
ensure that the trial is fair.
8 6
The standard Strickland established, however, is very
deferential to counsel's performance.8 7 Indeed, as the Court made
clear in that case and in another case decided the same day, there
is a presumption that counsel's performance is effective.8 8 This
deference undercuts the pursuit of justice, because it means that,
for all intents and purposes, attorney decisions regarding trial
strategy and tactics are largely immune from attack from a
defendant claiming ineffectiveness. 8 9 Such deference, in Justice
84. See id. at 694 (stating the test for prejudice as: "[tihe defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different"). With regard to the burden
of proof, see United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984) (stating that the
burden of proving a constitutional violation of the right to effective assistance of
counsel rests with the defendant).
85. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
86. Id. at 685; see also id. at 684 ("[Tlhis Court has recognized that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the
fundamental right to a fair trial."); id. at 686 (stating that producing a "just result"
is the purpose of the constitutional requirement of effective assistance of counsel).
87. Id. at 689. ('Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly
deferential.").
88. See id. at 689 (noting that "a court must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance"); Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658 (stating that "we presume that the lawyer is
competent to provide the guiding hand that the defendant needs").
89. See COOK, supra note 67, at 8-92 ("Tactical and strategic decisions which
might have been handled differently by many or even most attorneys will not
establish incompetence."); cf. 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 70, at 717-18. Professor
Wayne LaFave observes, however, that:
[A] decision apparently based on a tactical judgment is not therefore
rendered immune from an incompetency challenge .... Speaking to the
interplay between an attorney's duty to investigate and the making of
strategic decisions, the Strickland Court did note that 'strategic choices
made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible
options are virtually unchallengeable.' This [standard] obviously requires
great deference for strategic choices, but it comes with the important
prerequisite of a 'complete investigation.'
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Marshall's words, "covertly... legitim[izes] convictions and
sentences obtained on the basis of incompetent conduct by defense
counsel." 90
Also problematic for the pursuit of justice is Strickland's
requirement that prejudice be shown before a defendant who is
the victim of incompetent counsel can obtain relief.91 So long as
counsel's errors do not have a "reasonable probability" of casting
"reasonable doubt" on the defendant's guilt, the Court said, those
errors can be ignored.92 Due process, however, in this instance,
should not depend on proving injury. The absence of fair
procedures itself should be sufficient to establish a constitutional
violation. 93
Finally, the Supreme Court has also made clear that the
right to effective counsel does not mean that a defendant has the
right to "meaningful" counsel. In Morris v. Slappy,94 decided one
year before Strickland, the Court reviewed a ruling by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel "include[s] the right to a meaningful attorney-client
relationship." 95 The Court summarily rejected any such notion,
saying that "[n]o court could possibly guarantee that a defendant
will develop the kind of rapport with his attorney-privately
retained or provided by the public-that the Court of Appeals
thought part of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel."96
As explained below, the language used in Slappy conveys the
message that the Court does not really care about the nature of
the relationship between the appointed lawyer and the poor
client.97 Indigent clients care deeply about that relationship
because, most significantly, they have little or no say in who their
lawyer will be. In employing uncaring language and by
sanctioning procedures that the indigent sees as fundamentally
unfair, the Court in Slappy, like some aspects of the Strickland
opinion, undermined the Sixth Amendment's call for justice. 98
90. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 713 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
92. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 (1984) ("[Tlhe question is whether there is a
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a
reasonable doubt respecting guilt.").
93. See id. at 710-12 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that Stricklands
prejudice standard is erroneous and that the right to effective counsel guarantees
"fundamentally fair procedures" irrespective of the outcome in the case).
94. 461 U.S. 1 (1983).
95. Id. at 10-11.
96. Id. at 13-14,
97. See infra Part IV.B.
98. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668; infra Part IV.B.
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II. An Indigent Black Defendant's Concerns About Having
a White Court-Appointed Lawyer
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, while the
Supreme Court's right to counsel cases acknowledge the
importance of ensuring justice, some of those cases do a better job
than others in furthering that goal. With that goal in mind, this
Article now turns to the concerns an indigent Black defendant
may have in being appointed a white lawyer.9 9 For ease of
reference, these concerns have been incorporated into three broad
arguments: the Racism Argument, the Effectiveness Argument,
and the Expediency Argument. A Black defendant may rely on
one or a combination of these arguments in justifying his concerns
over having a white lawyer. 10 0 Each of these three arguments will
be discussed in turn.
A. The Racism Argument
The Racism Argument is predicated on a profound distrust of
the entire criminal justice system. It posits that racism infects
most, if not all, of the nation's criminal laws and the actors who
create, enforce, and interpret them. A defendant making this
argument believes either that his white appointed lawyer is racist
or that the criminal justice system, of which the appointed lawyer
is a part, is racist. In the defendant's mind, therefore, the lawyer
cannot be trusted. The result is that the defendant may refuse to
meaningfully communicate with the lawyer or rely on the latter's
judgment and advice. "I don't want to participate in this sham
representation," the defendant may say, "since this racist system
is already rigged against me, and you (the lawyer), whether racist
or not, are part of that system."
The concerns expressed in the Racism Argument may
constitute a fundamental impediment to establishing an effective
attorney-client relationship. These concerns may be based on
99. The focus here is on race-based concerns. Moreover, the purpose of this
section is not to examine whether the defendant's concerns are valid, but merely to
elaborate on what some of those concerns may be. This purpose is important to
remember, considering that some of the defendant's arguments may be racist or
predicated upon inaccurate racial stereotypes. Some of those stereotypes, for
example, that a white lawyer cannot be as effective as a Black lawyer, can also
work in the converse.
100. There may, of course, be other race-based concerns and arguments that a
Black defendant may have. This Article focuses only on those that the author has
been able to identify. These arguments also assume that the appointed lawyer is
competent to handle the defendant's case according to the standard established in
Strickland. See generally Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668 (1984).
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overt acts of racial discrimination, by the police for example,
inflicted upon or witnessed by the defendant personally. Or, they
may be based on racist acts that have been brought to the
accused's attention by family, friends, or the media. Such overt
acts, even just one, can produce a profound skepticism in the
fairness of "the system." "Justice is for white people," he may
believe, "not for a Black defendant like me."'10 1
The defendant's concerns also may be based on the existence
of a form of racism that is less overt, more subtle, but more
prevalent. 102 This racism is a product of what Professor Charles
Lawrence terms "unconscious racial motivation."'103  Racism,
according to Professor Lawrence, is embedded in our culture and is
part of a shared "common historical and cultural heritage."'' 04 This
shared cultural experience undergirds our thoughts and actions,
and influences our feelings about race. 10 5 Many of these feelings
cast people of color in a negative light, assume that whites are
somehow superior, or attach irrational significance to the color of a
person's skin. 10 6 According to Lawrence, most people are unaware
101. One USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll conducted in 1995 found that "sixty-six
percent of blacks believe that the criminal justice system is racist and only thirty-
two percent believe it is not racist." Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification:
Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 699 (1995); see also
id. at 699 n. 115 (stating the results of another poll that showed "that 54% of blacks
thought [the] criminal justice system was biased against blacks"); cf. Alexandra
Walker, Conversation in Black and White, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2001, at B8
(revealing that "[i]n June [2001], a Gallup Poll reported that 66 percent of black
Americans believe race relations always will be a problem in this country," and
that a "survey, conducted by Harvard University, the Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation and The Post, found that eight in 10 blacks say they occasionally
experience incidences of racism").
102. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 335 (1987)
C'Increasingly, as our culture has rejected racism as immoral and unproductive...
hidden [racial] prejudice has become the more prevalent form of racism."). When
he wrote that article, Lawrence was Professor of Law at Stanford University. Id. at
317 n.*. Currently, he is Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law
Center. See GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/index.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2001).
103. Lawrence, supra note 102, at 322.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 330 ('[Rlacism in America... is part of our common historical
experience and, therefore, a part of our culture. It arises from the assumptions we
have learned to make about the world, ourselves, and others as well as from the
patterns of our fundamental social activities.").
106. See id. at 322 C'Because of this shared experience, we also inevitably share
many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an individual's race
and induce negative feelings and opinions about nonwhites."). Lawrence adds:
For many whites, the explanation [for Black inequality] lies in the
inherent inferiority of blacks. Few will express this belief openly. It is no
longer consistent with American ideology to speak in terms of inherent
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of the influence these unconscious racist feelings have in their
everyday actions with minority groups. 107 "We do not recognize
the ways in which our cultural experience has influenced our
beliefs about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our
actions," Lawrence explains, "[because] [w]hen an individual
experiences conflict between racist ideas and the societal ethic
that condemns those ideas, the mind excludes his racism from
consciousness." 108
Thus, a white lawyer may not be conscious of the racism that
hangs like a cloud over the defendant's case. A Black defendant
making the Racism Argument, however, will be aware of this
racism or at least suspect its existence. Without studies or
statistics, and in the face of denials by "the system," this
defendant, in the words of Professor Paul Butler, "knows what he
knows": 10 9 that his race has been, and will be, an impediment to
retaining his liberty. 110
In sum, the Racism Argument is rooted in concerns Professor
Butler labels the Racial Liberal Critique and the Racial Radical
Critique.
American criminal justice is racist because it is controlled
primarily by white people, who are unable to escape the
culture's dominant message of white supremacy, and who are
therefore inevitably, even if unintentionally, prejudiced.
These white actors include legislators, police, prosecutors,
judges, and jurors. They exercise their discretion to make and
enforce the criminal law in a discriminatory fashion.
racial traits. But the myth of racial inferiority remains embedded in the
fabric of our culture.
Id. at 375.
107. Id. at 322 ("Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in
which racism has played and still plays a dominant role .... To the extent that
this cultural belief system has influenced all of us, we are all racists. At the same
time, most of us are unaware of our racism.").
108. Id. at 323.
109. In his article, The Evil of American Criminal Justice: A Reply, George
Washington University Law Professor Paul Butler describes the concept of
"knowing what you know" to establish the existence of some fact, like racism, that
is not readily provable. See Paul Butler, The Evil of American Criminal Justice: A
Reply, 44 UCLA L. REV. 143, 143-44 (1996). "Knowing what you know," writes
Butler, "refers to those beliefs, often emotional, that are at the core of one's being
and that precede or subvert education and other formal ways of knowing." Id. at
143.
110. See id. at 143-44 ("I think that knowing what you know informs the
perspective of many African Americans when they consider the ugly statistic that
one out of three young black men [as opposed to one in fourteen white men] are
under criminal supervision ...."); id. at 145 n.8 (noting the statistic that "[i]n the
United States, there are more young black men in prison than in college ... [and]
there are more African-American men, in absolute numbers, in prison than whites,
even though white men outnumber African-American men more than five to one").
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Sometimes the discrimination is overt.., and sometimes it is
unintentional .... [Further, the] criminal law is racist
because, like other American law, it is an instrument of white
supremacy. Law is made by white elites to protect their
interests and, especially, to preserve the economic status quo,
which benefits those elites at the expense of blacks, among
others. Due to discrimination and segregation, the majority of
African Americans receive few meaningful educational and
employment opportunities and, accordingly, are unable to
succeed, at least in the terms of the capitalist ideal. 111
Finally, the indigent defendant's poverty may exacerbate his
feelings of alienation and powerlessness. Not only does a poor
defendant not have any say in who his appointed lawyer will be,
but, like the defendant in Morris v. Slappy,112 whose counsel
announced that he was ready for trial over his client's objection, he
also may be thwarted from controlling the conduct of his own
defense. 113 As some commentators have observed:
Indigents commonly mistrust the public defender assigned to
them and view him as part of the same court bureaucracy that
is "processing" and convicting them. The lack of trust is a
major obstacle to establishing an effective attorney-client
relationship. The problem was captured in a sad exchange
between a social science researcher and a prisoner: "Did you
have a lawyer when you went to court?" "No. I had a public
defender."114
B. The Effectiveness Argument
This argument is more practical than the Racism Argument.
It focuses not on the prevalence of racism, but on the effectiveness
of counsel. It asserts that a white court-appointed lawyer cannot
be as effective on behalf of a Black defendant as an African-
American lawyer. 15
111. Butler, supra note 101, at 692-93. For commonly cited examples of racism
in the criminal justice system, see id. at 695-697.
112. 461 U.S. 1 (1983).
113. In contrast, a retained lawyer who disobeys his client's wishes can be
summarily fired and replaced. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16
cmts. 4 & 5 (2001) CA client has a right to discharge a [retained] lawyer at any
time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer's
services .... Whether a client can discharge appointed counsel may depend on
applicable law ....").
114. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 70, at 86.
115. The assumption in this section is that the defendant's objective is to "win"
his case, i.e., obtain a dismissal of the charge(s), an acquittal of same, or an
acceptable sentence. See id. at 77 C'Criminal defendants, we may assume, are
ordinarily interested in winning acquittal, or if that fails, the lowest possible
sentence."). This Article does not address the concerns of a criminal defendant
with a different objective, e.g., a political activist who orchestrates his arrest and
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The basis for this argument is not that the appointed lawyer
or the system is racist per se, but that the lawyer, being a member
of the majority, cannot or will not fully understand or appreciate
what it means to be Black in America. Consequently, the lawyer
cannot or will not accept or truly understand the prevalence of
racism in the criminal justice system; the interplay between race
and poverty; and the effects racism plays in the upbringing of
African-American youth in this country, including how and why
race contributed to the defendant facing these particular criminal
charges. Given this lack of acceptance and understanding, the
argument goes, a white lawyer may "[fail] to take racial
differences into account [and thereby miss] a large part of the
client's story and problem."' 116
The reason a defendant of color may have this concern is the
unique but shared effect race has on his life. As Professor David
Wilkins has written:
Race exerts a major influence over every significant aspect of
the lives of black Americans. It literally colors the way that
we are perceived by the world at the same time that it shapes
our self-perceptions. As a result, blacks are inextricably
bound together, both in the sense that the actions of
individual blacks impact the opportunities of other blacks, and
in the manner in which the opportunities available to all
blacks are tied to the fate of the black community as a whole.
Consequently, race is likely to be an important aspect of a
black American's identity, if only to the extent that blacks
seek to protect black identity from negative attacks by others.
The essential point is that in today's America, race matters in
ways that inevitably structure identity.
11 7
wants a trial to showcase his cause, or a defendant who wants to hire an African-
American lawyer to support the advancement of Black lawyers in the legal
profession.
116. Acevedo et al., supra note 5, at 15 ("[Wlhites may be unaware and
unfamiliar with the lives of their clients of color to such an extent that failure to
take racial differences into account may mean missing a large part of the client's
story and problem.").
117. David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and Professional
Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502, 1532-33 (1998). When his article appeared,
Wilkins was Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law and Director of the Program on
the Legal Profession at Harvard Law School. Id. at 1502 n.*. One observer has
noted that:
[R]ace 'transcends place, creating a community that has little to do with
geography but everything to do with the larger political and cultural
community of color.' This larger community, 'generally recognizes the
reality of racism, the pleasure of a common culture, and the need to act
together to effectuate common interests and to remedy common problems
that repeat themselves across geographical divides.'
Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1351 (1998) (quoting Lisa A.
Kelly, Race and Place: Geographic and Transcendent Community in the Post-Shaw
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Thus, a Black indigent defendant may feel more comfortable
with a lawyer of his own race. He may believe that a Black lawyer
will be less critical and more sensitive, accepting, knowledgeable,
and empathetic than a white attorney. 1 8 In sum, he may make
assumptions about the lawyer's ability based on the latter's race.
A recent written survey of lawyers in the Civil Division of the
New York City Legal Aid Society illustrates this point." 9 When
asked, "Do you believe your clients take the race of their attorney
into consideration?" a majority of the white female lawyers and
lawyers of color (male and female) answered in the affirmative. 120
One Black attorney stated that "clients often make assumptions
about the ability of their lawyer to identify with their concerns
based on whether or not their attorney is of the same race.'. 121 A
Latino lawyer wrote, "I sense a certain degree of apprehension and
confusion when the attorney of record lacks the necessary
sensitivity with minority clients."'122 As the authors of this survey
concluded:
Those who share a common identity group factor such as race,
should feel better able to communicate their needs and their
feelings to others of the same race. Their shared identity
would facilitate understanding and allow for more productive
counseling. What little scholarship there is in this area seems
to support this theory. 123
Based at least in part on the assumption that race affects
ability, an accused of color making the Effectiveness Argument
Era, 49 VAND. L. REV. 227, 234-35 (1996)).
118. See Acevedo et al., supra note 5, at 56 ('Clearly, a Black Latina attorney
who was raised in poverty and experienced discrimination firsthand will view
racism differently than a white male raised in affluent suburbs who has been
taught to disregard the 'invisible package of unearned assets."' (citation omitted)).
119. The survey sent out ninety-seven anonymous questionnaires to staff and
managing attorneys in the Civil Division of the Legal Aid Society of the City of New
York. See id. at 25. "The Civil Division is the largest provider of civil legal services
to the poor in New York City." Id. at 28. Whereas some ninety percent of the
Division's clients are people of color, sixty-three percent of the attorneys on staff
are white. Id. at 29. The purpose of the survey was to test the Neutrality and Race
Consciousness models of lawyering. Id. at 3-4.
120. Id. at 33-34. Interestingly, a majority of white male attorneys answered
"no" to this question, "indicating that they do not believe that their clients take the
race of their attorney into account." Id. at 33.
121. Id. at 34.
122. Id.; see also id. at 37-38 (noting in the same survey that "the majority (59%)
of all people of color believed that their race had a positive effect, indicating that
they felt that the race-based commonality they have with their clients facilitates
representation of those clients" and that, in contrast, "as a group, [71% of] white
attorneys believe that race does not play a part in the attorney-client
relationship").
123. Id. at 18.
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believes that a white lawyer will be less effective than a Black
attorney. 124 Four areas in particular may be of concern. First, the
accused may be concerned about the lawyer's effectiveness in the
courtroom. He may believe that a white lawyer will not relate as
well to the judge, jury, or prosecutor, or that they will not relate as
well to him. This concern may be general or it may relate to a
specific issue in the defendant's case. For instance, the accused
may want his race or racism to be a central part of his defense. He
may want to "play the race card," and he may feel that it will be
done more effectively by a lawyer of color. 125 Examples of such a
defense include arguing to the fact-finder that it should disregard
some key piece of evidence because it is tainted by racism, that it
should return a not guilty verdict because the entire prosecution is
racist, or that it should nullify the verdict because of the
defendant's race. 126
Second, the defendant may be concerned with the lawyer's
effectiveness in negotiations with the prosecutor. The accused
may feel that a white lawyer cannot negotiate for a plea bargain
as effectively because, as noted, he does not fully understand a
Black defendant's situation, background, or perspective. In this
sense, an African-American lawyer may be able to negotiate with
more credibility and authority than his white counterpart. This is
particularly true, the defendant may believe, in cases where race
or racism is an issue in the case, which it frequently is. Indeed, a
Black accused may legitimately believe that race is always an
issue in the case, most notably in sentencing where sentencing
guidelines disparately impact Black offenders. Likewise,
arguments to the prosecutor that a particular police officer
targeted the defendant because of his race or that some key piece
124. The defendant's race also may be a factor in the lawyer's effectiveness.
Many lawyers, Black and white, believe that people of color are not treated as fairly
by the courts as whites. See, e.g., id. at 48 (reporting that a majority of the
attorneys surveyed (Black and white) in the Civil Division of New York City's Legal
Aid Society believe that their clients of color are treated less favorably than their
white clients).
125. This argument assumes that there is a legitimate basis for the "race card"
defense in the facts of the case.
126. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 101, at 677 (arguing that African-American
jurors should take race into account in deciding whether to nullify a verdict); see
also id. at 705 (stating that "[any juror legally may vote for nullification in any
case, but, certainly, jurors should not do so without some principled basis"); cf.
John W. Bissell, Comments On Jury Nullification, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 51,
55-56 (1997) (stating that nullification is a violation of the juror's sworn oath to
return a verdict consistent with the evidence and the law, and quoting one federal
judge as saying, "[jury nullified] verdicts are lawless, a denial of due process and
constitut[e] an exercise of erroneously seized power" (citation omitted)).
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of evidence should be discredited because of racism may fare
better coming from an African American. Finally, the prosecutor
himself may be a person of color, and the defendant may believe
that having a lawyer of the same race will result in better rapport
between the two.
A third area in which effectiveness may be a concern is
investigation and trial preparation. A defendant making the
Effectiveness Argument could claim that a Black lawyer can get
greater and better access to some African-American witnesses or
be more likely to succeed in obtaining relevant information from
them. He may feel, for instance, that some witnesses will be more
likely to cooperate with a Black lawyer than a white one. Access
to predominately Black neighborhoods may also be viewed as
easier for a Black lawyer, who may be welcomed as a "brother
helping a brother."' 27
Finally, our hypothetical defendant could argue that a Black
lawyer will be more effective at gaining the trust and confidence of
the accused's family and friends. These groups may be more apt to
trust such a lawyer, who is "one of them," than a white attorney
who could be viewed as being aligned with the very system that is
responsible for prosecuting the defendant. The appointed lawyer's
effectiveness within this milieu may be of paramount importance
to the accused, as the accused may be relying on advice from his
family and friends during the progression of the case.
Regardless of whether the defendant is concerned with
courtroom effectiveness or his counsel's effectiveness outside the
courtroom, a defendant making the Effectiveness Argument
believes that race matters in his counsel's performance. Perhaps
this is why, as one attorney in the aforementioned Legal Aid
survey noted, "there are ... clients who specifically request a
'black attorney."' 128
C. The Expediency Argument
Like the preceding argument, the Expediency Argument
focuses on the practical. It starts from the same premise as the
Effectiveness Argument: that a white attorney, being an
"outsider," does not fully understand or appreciate what it means
to be Black in America. Because of this deficiency, both of these
arguments would say, the white lawyer is handicapped,
127. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 284 (1981)
(defining "brother," among other definitions, as "a person regarded as sharing a
common national or racial origin with the user of the word").
128. Acevedo et al., supra note 5, at 35 n. 142.
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detrimentally affecting his performance on behalf of his client.
But, whereas the Effectiveness Argument claims that the
white lawyer cannot be as effective as his Black counterpart, the
Expediency Argument says that he can. In other words, the white
lawyer's deficiency in knowledge, understanding, and sensitivity
can be rectified. He can be re-educated and re-indoctrinated to
think as a Black lawyer, at least to the extent that he can be as
effective as one. Accomplishing these tasks, however, would
require substantial time and effort, commodities that the indigent
defendant has in short supply. Thus, the bottom line of the
Expediency Argument is the same as the Racism and
Effectiveness Arguments: a Black lawyer is preferable to a white
one.
The Expediency Argument represents a fallback position of
sorts for an African-American client defending his desire for a
Black lawyer. "I concede that you, the white lawyer, are not
racist, and can be as effective as a Black attorney," the client
would say, "but, you must concede that your performance on my
behalf may not be as effective as your Black counterpart given the
effects race has played and will play on my case (see Effectiveness
Argument)." "To rectify this problem," the client continues, "I, at a
minimum, will have to spend many hours educating you, and
sharing with you my experiences and insights about race. Neither
you nor I have the time or willingness to undertake this enormous
task, so I tell you again, I want a Black lawyer to represent me."
In the final analysis, the Expediency Argument takes a
pessimistic view of the white appointed attorney-Black indigent
client relationship. It acknowledges that there is a problem with
that relationship, but that the problem is beyond repair given the
practicalities of the "real world." Much of this pessimism is well-
founded, being based on the "real world" indigent defense
phenomena of inadequate defense funding and resources,
appalling attorney-to-client ratios, and insensitive judges who are
often more interested in moving cases along than doing justice. 129
129. One example of this insensitivity can be found in the state and federal
criminal courts in Alexandria, Virginia. Both of these courts utilize what is
euphemistically called "The Rocket Docket," under which criminal cases, even very
serious ones, must go to trial or plead out within a certain accelerated time period,
often sixty days, after indictment. For overworked public defenders, this rush to
trial puts an enormous strain on the already stressed attorney-client relationship.
This kind of scheduling is particularly egregious when the defendant's case enters
the system though an indictment rather than an arrest warrant. Such cases
generally have already been "worked up" and investigated by the government prior
to the indictment so that the prosecutor is, for all practical purposes, ready for trial
before the court-appointed lawyer has even received the case. Of course,
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Some of this pessimism is also grounded in laziness and inertia.
After all, creating a better racial relationship with the lawyer
requires hard, sometimes painful work. Overcoming that inertia
is difficult, to say the least, especially given the deservedly
fatalistic approach to which most Black indigent defendants are
inclined. In this sense, then, the Expediency Argument is similar
to the Racism Argument, as both see "the system" as the source of
the problem.
III. The White Court-Appointed Lawyer's Possible
Responses
Like the defendant's arguments, the white lawyer's responses
will be dictated by his perspective, a perspective that may view
racism differently given his upbringing, education, and enjoyment
of the majority's 'invisible package of unearned assets."'1 30  The
key is for the lawyer to see all perspectives, to step outside of
himself, as it were, so that he can bring to the table a more
informed view. Of course, some of the following responses will do
that better than others, and some not at all.
Some of the responses also contain elements of what
Professor Alan Freeman has described in the context of racial
discrimination law as the Perpetrator Perspective and the Victim
Perspective.' 31 As Professor Freeman sees it, anti-discrimination
law can take either of these two perspectives, the latter
perspective being the more desirable of the two. 132
The Perpetrator Perspective views the underlying cause of
racial discrimination not as a systemic problem, but as the
defendants with means are not as prejudiced by such scheduling, as they can hire
their retained lawyers well before arrest/indictment.
130. Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of
Coming to See Correspondence Through Work in Women's Studies, in CRITICAL
WHITE STUDIES, LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR 291 (Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic eds., 1997). McIntosh writes:
I have come to see white privilege as an invisible package of unearned
assets which I can count on cashing in each day, but about which I was
'meant' to remain oblivious. White privilege is like an invisible weightless
knapsack of special provisions, assurances, tools, maps, guides, codebooks,
passports, visas, clothes, compass, emergency gear, and blank checks.
Id.; see also id. at 293-94 (listing forty-six privileges that whites enjoy merely
because of their skin color, including Caucasians' assurance "that if [they] need
legal or medical help, [their] race will not work against [them]").
131. See Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L.
REV. 1049, 1049 (1978). When his article appeared, Freeman was Professor of Law
at the University of Minnesota Law School. Id.
132. See id. at 1052-57.
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individual action or actions of a perpetrator on a victim. 133 Its
focus is to stop the particular perpetrator, not to address the
underlying conditions that cause the discrimination. 134 Thus, for
instance, the solution under the Perpetrator Perspective for an act
of discrimination by a waiter in a restaurant would be to fire the
waiter rather than to address the hiring and training practices of
the waiters restaurant-wide.
The Victim Perspective, on the other hand, views
discrimination as more than just the individual acts of some
bigots. This perspective says that the root causes of
discrimination lie deeper, in the structure of our laws and in the
societal conditions that treat African Americans as "member[s] of
the perpetual underclass." 135  Under this perspective, racial
discrimination will persist until conditions like unemployment,
inferior schools, and inadequate housing are eliminated. 136
Freeman argues that anti-discrimination law is "hopelessly
embedded in the perpetrator perspective."13 7 As will be seen, that
perspective also permeates some of the responses a white
appointed lawyer may have to our hypothetical African-American
client. And to the extent that those responses are infused with the
Perpetrator Perspective, the cause of justice-a key principle
behind the Sixth Amendment-is undermined.
Generally, the lawyer responding to a Black defendant's
concerns can take two broad approaches: he can dispute the
defendant's concerns, or he can agree with them in whole or part.
The responses in these two approaches can be categorized into
133. See id. at 1053.
134. See id. Professor Freeman writes:
The perpetrator perspective sees racial discrimination not as conditions,
but as actions, or series of actions, inflicted on the victim by the
perpetrator. The focus is more on what particular perpetrators have done
or are doing to some victims than it is on the overall life situation of the
victim class.
Id.
135. Id. at 1052-53. Freeman further states:
From the victim's perspective, racial discrimination describes those
conditions of actual social existence as a member of a perpetual
underclass. This perspective includes both the objective conditions of
life-lack of jobs, lack of money, lack of housing-and the consciousness
associated with those objective conditions-lack of choice and lack of
human individuality in being forever perceived as a member of a group
rather than as an individual.
Id.
136. See id. at 1053 ('The victim ... conception of racial discrimination suggests




three groups: the Denial or the No Racism Response, the
Irrelevance Response, and the Relevance Response. The lawyer
may rely on one of these individually or in combination in
addressing the defendant's concerns over having a white lawyer. 13
Each of these three responses and their variants will now be
discussed in turn.13 9
A. Denial or the No Racism Response
The thrust of this response is to deny that racism exists or is
still a problem. It attempts to answer the charge made in the
Racism Argument that either the white court-appointed lawyer is
racist or the system, of which he is a part, is racist. The Denial or
No Racism Response asserts simply that the defendant is wrong;
that is, it is inaccurate to say that the white lawyer and/or the
system as a whole are racist. "You are mistaken," the lawyer may
say to his African-American client, "racism is no longer a problem,
and you should therefore trust me/the system."
1. The "not us" variant
One variant of the No Racism Response is to deny the
continued existence of racism in both the individual lawyer and
the system as a whole. "Racism was at one time a serious
problem," the lawyer might say, "but it is now a thing of the past,
and neither I nor the police, prosecutors, judges, or jurors are
racists."
This variant attempts to address the defendant's charge of
racism in one broad and swift stroke by grouping together the
individual lawyer and "the system." Its purpose is to get past the
charge, to dismiss it, so that the lawyer can move on to other
138. Like the indigent Black defendant's concerns, the white appointed lawyer's
responses may be based on racist beliefs or inaccurate racial stereotypes. Again,
this Article does not examine the validity of these responses, but merely elaborates
on what some of the responses may be. There may, of course, be other responses
that a white lawyer may have. This Article focuses only on those which the author
has been able to identify. Moreover, as before, these responses assume that the
appointed lawyer is competent to handle the defendant's case according to the
standard established in Strickland. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
These responses also assume that the lawyer shares the same objective as the
defendant, i.e., to "win" the case as defined by the defendant.
139. One other approach, not discussed in this Article, is for the lawyer
purposely to divert the defendant's attention away from racial concerns by
discussing other concerns, for example, the defendant's poverty, that also could
have a tremendous impact on the lawyer's effectiveness. Again, the focus of this
Article is on race-based concerns and the responses thereto, and not on other
concerns.
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issues that he feels are more germane to the defendant's case. A
lawyer employing this approach refuses to engage substantively
the defendant on the issue of race. It is an approach that is
condescending, not to say naive, for in its summary dismissal, it
does not respect the defendant's feelings or intellect.
As such, the "not us" variant falls clearly within Freeman's
Perpetrator Perspective. As with that perspective, this variant
'declare[s] that the war is over,"' that "the problem of racial
discrimination... has been solved."'140 "But for an occasional
aberrational practice," the lawyer might say parroting Freeman,
"future society [in which racial discrimination no longer exists] is
already here and functioning."'14 1 Put another way, the lawyer
might simply say, "don't worry, be happy."
2. The "not me" variant
Another variant of the Denial Response is to concede that the
system may be racist, but assert that the particular appointed
lawyer is not. Like the first variant, this falls within the
Perpetrator Perspective because of its "no problem" approach. It
attempts to separate the lawyer from the system, hoping that it
will allay the defendant's concern that racism is everywhere. In
the manner of the Perpetrator Perspective, the lawyer hopes to
separate himself from "those blameworthy individuals who are
violating the otherwise shared norm." 142 Thus, the white lawyer
in this variant, like the Wizard of Oz, asks the accused to ignore
what is behind the curtain. 143 "I am a good person," the lawyer
would say, "and my intent is good and my motives pure, and that
should be good enough for you."
By focusing the dialogue on his own good intentions, the
lawyer in this variant echoes the views of what Butler calls, the
"law enforcement enthusiasts."'144 Proponents of this view claim
that "intent is the most appropriate barometer of ... racism."145
140. Freeman, supra note 131, at 1102 (citation omitted).
141. Id. at 1103 (arguing that post-1973 Supreme Court cases construing anti-
discrimination laws rationalize "[t]hat but for an occasional aberrational practice,
future society is already here and functioning").
142. Id. at 1054.
143. THE WIZARD OF OZ (MGM 1939) (In an attempt to discourage Dorothy and
her companions from uncovering the illusion of his omnipotence, the Wizard
demands in a thunderous voice, 'Pay no attention to that man behind the
curtain!").
144. Butler, supra note 101, at 697.
145. Id. at 697-98 ('According to... law enforcement enthusiasts, the criminal
law may have a disproportionate impact on the black community, but this is not a
moral or racial issue because the disproportionate impact is the law's effect, not its
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That is, racism requires proof of discriminatory intent, and absent
such proof, there is no problem to remedy. 146 This is so even if the
effect of doing nothing is to perpetuate more racism.
By casting himself as an innocent person, moreover, the
lawyer employs an approach sanctioned by no less than the U.S.
Supreme Court. According to Lawrence, the Court in Washington
v. Davis147 held, inter alia, that a racially disproportionate impact
is not enough to challenge the constitutionality of a facially
neutral law. 148  Racially discriminatory purpose or intent is
required, because otherwise, "innocent people [will] bear the costs
of remedying a harm in which they played no part." 49 Similarly, a
lawyer utilizing the "not me" variant of the Denial Response may
claim that the Black defendant's rejection of his appointed lawyer
is tantamount to punishing an "innocent" person (the lawyer) for
the sins of the system.
As such, this variant asks the defendant to ignore the
detrimental effects the racism of "the system" will have on his
case, assuming that the defendant even believes his lawyer is not
a racist per se. The variant also fails to account for Lawrence's
"unconscious racism." If the defendant believes, as Lawrence does,
that we are all motivated by unconscious racist feelings-that, in
effect, "we are all racists"' 5 0-then it will bring the defendant no
solace to hear his lawyer say, "I am not bad even if the system is."
Such a response is akin to the Court's approach in Davis that,
using Freeman's terminology, unless there is a "perpetrator,"
there is no problem to remedy. 151
Finally, underlying both variants of the Denial Response is
the belief that a defendant who makes the Racism Argument may
himself be engaged in racist thinking. That is, that he may be
judging the lawyer, without knowing anything about him, based
merely on the color of his skin. A lawyer using this response will
thus encourage the defendant to assume nothing and not to
intent. For law enforcement enthusiasts, intent is the most appropriate barometer
of governmental racism.").
146. See Freeman, supra note 131, at 1054 ("Central to the perpetrator
perspective are the twin notions of 'fault' and 'causation'...
147. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
148. See Lawrence, supra note 102, at 318 (stating that Davis established the
doctrine that "plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of a facially neutral law
[must] prove a racially discriminatory purpose on the part of those responsible for
the law's enactment or administration").
149. Id. at 320.
150. Id. at 322 ('To the extent that this cultural belief system has influenced all
of us, we are all racists .... ").
151. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.
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employ what may be inaccurate racial stereotypes. Rather, the
lawyer may suggest, the defendant should judge each person on
the basis of that person's character alone so as not to impede the
development of a positive attorney-client relationship.
B. The Irrelevance Response
The Irrelevance Response focuses on the practical, and parts
of it speak to all three of the defendant's arguments (the Racism,
Effectiveness, and Expediency Arguments). The essence of the
response is that the race of the lawyer does not matter at all, or at
least not as much as the defendant believes. The racism vel non of
the system (or its actors) is not the focus, as this approach claims
that the lawyer should be "color-blind."'152 As such, he should not
take the race of any of the system's participants, including his
own, into account. 153
There are two variants of this response. The first addresses
the defendant's claim in the Effectiveness Argument that, in the
context of the defendant's case, a white lawyer cannot be as
effective as a lawyer who is African-American. The second
attempts to answer all three of the defendant's arguments by
focusing attention on the real-world practicalities of indigent
defense.
1. "Ability matters, not race" variant
This variant accepts the truth of the defendant's belief that
the white attorney cannot fully understand or appreciate what it
means to be Black, but it disagrees that because of this handicap,
the white lawyer cannot be as effective as (or more effective than)
his Black counterpart. Under this view, effectiveness depends not
on race, but on ability. That is, effective advocacy transcends race.
Thus, the judge, jury, and prosecutor will be swayed by the facts
and arguments, not by the racial identity of the lawyer. Likewise,
witnesses and the defendant's confidants, including his family and
friends, will respond favorably to a lawyer, regardless of race, who
is committed to the defendant and genuinely and diligently
working on his behalf.
152. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Our
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens .... ), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
153. See Russell, supra note 11, at 785-86 (defining "colorblind' lawyering" as
"advocacy strategies premised upon the position that racism is or should be
characterized as irrelevant to a particular context, even if it has been otherwise
raised in the proceedings").
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This variant further believes that trust is not a matter of
race. Rather, trust is earned over time and comes not from the
race of the lawyer, but from the hard work and results that the
lawyer achieves on his client's behalf. "Judge me by my results,"
the white lawyer might say, "not by my skin color."
The "ability matters, not race" variant's reliance on color-
blindness contains elements of Freeman's Perpetrator Perspective,
as it serves to "legitimize the status quo."'154 A different model of
lawyering, however, more precisely describes this variant. This
model is the Neutrality Model. 155  It posits that, given his
commitment to the "rule of law," a lawyer can and should provide
his best representation irrespective of his or the client's race. A
lawyer's capabilities, in other words, are not affected by his race,
but rather are race-neutral. 5 6 Hence,
"aspects of the self [sluch as one's race, gender, religion, or
ethnic background [are] irrelevant to defining one's
capabilities as a lawyer."... Therefore... race not only
should not be a factor in the attorney client relationship, but it
absolutely is not a factor if law school has done its job. 1 57
The reason that race is irrelevant under this model (i.e., that
a lawyer should "bleach out"158 any effects race has on his
professionalism) is that otherwise, people would come to believe
that justice is not uniform. The principle that justice is blind is
premised on the belief that the laws will be applied impartially
and that a lawyer's level of advocacy will not vary depending on
the client's skin color. If justice did vary, this model says, "there
would no longer be any reason to adhere to the law."'5 9
154. Freeman, supra note 131, at 1105 (noting that a problem with some of the
Supreme Court's antidiscrimination jurisprudence is that it "legitimizels] the
status quo by immunizing the preexisting condition of black underrepresentation
from statutory or constitutional scrutiny").
155. See Acevedo et al., supra note 5, at 3-12 (describing the Neutrality Model).
156. See id. at 3 (stating that under the Neutrality Model, "lawyers, because of
extensive socialization and training in law school, apply their skills equally to all
clients, regardless of the race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation of the
attorney or client." (citation omitted)).
157. Id. at 11 (quoting Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer:
Reflections on the Construction of Professional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577,
1579 (1993)).
158. Id. at 10 (quoting Professor Levinson as saying that the purpose of law
school is to instill a new professional identity in place of the existing one and that
in the process, law school "bleach[es] out' ... merely contingent aspects of the
self').
159. Id. at 7.
Without this commitment to neutrality, law would cease to be legitimate.
If people believed that the sort of justice that you were accorded depended
on personal identity factors, such as race, rather than the impartial
application of neutral laws, there would no longer be any reason to adhere
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Clients also need standardization, the Neutrality Model
claims. As Professor Wilkins explains:
From the client's perspective, this understanding of the
lawyer's role [that the quality of lawyering does not depend on
race] appears to offer vulnerable consumers the benefits of
standardization. Clients need not ask whether a given lawyer
does or does not subscribe to a particular professional norm.
Nor is it important for the client to investigate the lawyer's
background or personal beliefs, because these contingent
features are, by definition, irrelevant to how the lawyer will
perform her professional role. Given that many Americans
find racial issues especially difficult and divisive, bleached out
professionalism's promise to render racial questions irrelevant
is likely to appear particularly welcome to clients who believe
that focusing attention on race interferes with the
development of supportive and effective professional
relationships.160
Standardization is not just important for the clients, but also
for the legal institution as a whole. Neutrality, or "bleached-out
professionalism," ensures that lawyers will adhere to a standard
set of professional norms, norms that are essential to holding
attorneys accountable to a code of conduct. 16 1 Neutrality also
helps ensure that the legal profession will remain a viable vehicle
for societal advancement. Without bleached-out professionalism,
the argument goes, minority lawyers might be treated differently,
thus depriving them of the social benefits and prestige that
ordinarily accompany a law degree. 162
Thus, under the "ability matters, not race" variant of the
Irrelevance Response, the white lawyer's pitch to his Black client
is as follows: "I can and will present the best defense regardless of
my race, including playing the 'race card' if that is in your best
interest. My ability and professionalism will not be affected by my
skin color; nor will my effectiveness on your behalf. My race, in
other words, is irrelevant."
to the law.
Id. (citation omitted).
160. Wilkins, supra note 117, at 1512.
161. See id. at 1513 (stating that removing the promise of uniformity "would
arguably make it even more difficult for society to hold lawyers accountable for
protecting legal rules and structures, because divergent groups of lawyers might
hold quite different understandings of how they should relate to clients and state
officials").
162. See id. at 1513-14 (discussing the reasons that abandoning the bleached-out
professionalism model would "undermine the legal profession's role as an
important avenue for social advancement").
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2. The "no choice" variant
The second variant of the Irrelevance Response is the more
practical of the two, and, in its brutally honest way, attempts to
address all three of the defendant's arguments. This variant says
that irrespective of the defendant's arguments on racism,
effectiveness, and expediency, and even assuming the validity of
those arguments, the accused's options are limited. In an ideal
world the defendant could hire whomever he wants. However, in
this, the real world, an indigent Black defendant who cannot hire
an attorney only has three options: (1) keep the white lawyer who
has already been appointed; (2) ask the court to appoint a different
lawyer who is of the same race as the defendant; or (3) represent
himself.
The last option is not a viable choice for most defendants,
given the complexity of the criminal law and trial practice. 163 Self-
representation is even less attractive for those who are in custody.
Moreover, there are legal disincentives. For example, a pro se
litigant who is convicted may not thereafter be allowed to
complain of ineffective assistance of counsel.164 Similarly, the
second option is not practical, both because the accused does not
have the right to choose who his appointed counsel will be, 65 and
because it would be improper for a judge to remove the current
appointed lawyer merely because the latter happens to be
Caucasian. Moreover, even if the judge grants the defendant's
request, there is a risk that replacement counsel will be less
qualified than the lawyer he is replacing.
The first option, therefore, practically speaking, is the only
one left to the defendant. Realistically, according to the "no choice"
variant, the defendant should keep the white lawyer, that being
the least unattractive option available. "You might not be happy
with the situation," the white lawyer may say to his client, "but
you are stuck with me, so let's make the best of it." Or, a lawyer
with less finesse might simply say, "I'm your lawyer. Take it or
163. See Amy Bach, Justice on the Cheap, THE NATION, May 21, 2001, at 27
(reporting that "[nlationally, only 1 percent of felony defendants represented
themselves in the nation's seventy-five largest counties in 1992"); cf. 3 LAFAVE ET
AL., supra note 70, at 567 (observing generally that when a trial court denies a
defendant's request for substitute appointed counsel or for more time to hire
retained counsel, "[v]ery often the defendant will choose [to represent himself],
noting that he does so only because it is the lesser of two evils").
164. See COOK, supra note 67, at 8-114 (stating that courts have found that "[an
accused who elects to defend pro se may not thereafter complain of ineffective
assistance").
165. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
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leave it."
As can be seen, both variants of the Irrelevance Response
seek to preserve a status quo that the defendant finds
unsatisfying, and in that sense they possess shades of Freeman's
Perpetrator Perspective. 166 Moreover, as with the Denial or No
Racism Response, underlying the Irrelevance Response is the
message that the defendant should not impede the development of
a positive attorney-client relationship by resorting to racist logic or
inaccurate racial stereotypes. "My race is irrelevant to my legal
persona," the lawyer may counsel his client. "Work with me and I
will prove it."
C. The Relevance Response
The final response our hypothetical lawyer may proffer takes
the opposite approach to the Irrelevance Response. The Relevance
Response acknowledges both that racism is a serious problem in
this country and that irrespective of racism, the race of the lawyer
(and the client for that matter) does impact both the attorney-
client relationship and the lawyer's effectiveness. This response,
therefore, admits the relevance of racism and race. At the same
time, however, this response does not concede that the client
should jettison his white court-appointed lawyer. Rather, this
response says that, for a number of reasons, including the
practicalities of the real world, the lawyer and client should stay
together.
The Relevance Response has three variants. All of these
variants focus on the effectiveness of counsel for the reason that,
even for the defendant making the Racism Argument, the lawyer's
effectiveness is the single most important issue for a defendant
who wants to win his case. The variants differ, however, in this
respect: the first two agree with the view that racism infects the
criminal justice system (including the lawyer) and/or that because
of his white upbringing, a white lawyer cannot fully understand or
appreciate what it means to be African-American; the third
variant disagrees that a white lawyer, just because he is
Caucasian, cannot understand or appreciate what it means to be
Black. Each of these variants will be discussed in turn.167
166. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.
167. There is another variant of the Relevance Response that, for the following
reasons, is not treated in depth in this Article. This variant, which can be called
the "I quit" variant, says that all of the defendant's arguments are absolutely true
and his request for a Black lawyer should be honored without any discussion of the
underlying issues. The lawyer says, in effect, "If you don't want me, I will quit."
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1. The "you need a white lawyer" variant
The first variant of the Relevance Response attempts to
respond to the defendant's Racism and Effectiveness Arguments.
This variant posits that the Black defendant will be better off with
a white lawyer precisely because racism infects the criminal
justice system. "If you believe the system is racist," the white
lawyer might say, "then you need a white lawyer."168 This is also
true if, as the Effectiveness Argument claims, the white lawyer
cannot fully understand or appreciate the environment from which
the African-American client comes. "I agree that I cannot fully
understand your environment," a lawyer making this response
might say, "but it is also true that as a lawyer, I do understand the
environment of the criminal justice system. And it is within that
environment that you are now forced to operate, an environment,
by the way, that is primarily run by (not to mention developed and
constructed by) whites."
Despite its odiousness, 169 the power of the "you need a white
This variant constitutes a response that a conscientious lawyer would not
make. First, if the lawyer truly believes, as this Article assumes, that it is in the
best interests of the defendant for the latter to remain a client of the former, then
the lawyer should do everything ethically within his power to persuade the
defendant to remain a client. Second, the "I quit" variant is neither realistic nor
practical given the real-world options discussed in Part IlI.B above. Finally, this
variant represents a complete abdication of the lawyer's responsibility, both as an
officer of the court and as a member of society, to promote justice and better
relations between people of different races and ethnicities. At a minimum, a
conscientious lawyer should look upon the defendant's race-based concerns as an
opportunity to engage in a meaningful dialogue with an eye toward improving
understanding between lawyer and client.
168. A survey of attorneys of color in the Civil Division of the New York City
Legal Aid Society revealed that "many... clients of color actually preferred
attorneys who embodied the clients' stereotype of what lawyers should be."
Acevedo et al., supra note 5, at 35. For instance, in the survey, "[o]ne African-
American [female attorney] stated 'clients must take the race of their attorney into
consideration since when it comes to lawyers society thinks Jewish is better."' Id.
Another African-American attorney in the survey "wrote that 'sometimes clients
come to the office openly stating that they want a (white) Jewish attorney."' Id.
169. One reason for this odiousness is that the "you need a white lawyer" variant
relies at least in part on racist logic and/or racial stereotypes that may be
inaccurate. In this context, a separate question arises regarding whether the
lawyer's responses should include ones that rely on such logic or stereotypes. Is it
proper or even ethical for a lawyer to meet a racist argument with a racist
argument? See Sheri L. Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L.
REV. 1739, 1750-60, 1799-1803 (1993) (discussing the use of racial stereotypes in
criminal trials and arguing the use of racial imagery by lawyers should be strictly
limited, to wit: "use of racial imagery should be subject to the same strict scrutiny
standard as other racial classifications"); see also Wilkins supra note 117, at 1587
(advocating against lawyers raising arguments "designed solely to appeal to the
racial prejudice of jurors, [as such arguments] do nothing to further the defendant's
underlying right to put the State to its proof' and stating that "arguments of this
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lawyer" variant is hard to deny. The sad fact is that the system
itself, and particular actors within it, do treat African Americans
differently than whites. For this reason, a white lawyer may be
more effective than his Black counterpart. As Wilkins has
observed, "Black clients, who bear the brunt of the legal system's
racism, may find it more difficult to secure justice if they hire a
black lawyer." 7 0 This inequality of treatment may be particularly
pronounced when race or racism is a specific issue in the case.
Professor Margaret Russell, for instance, argues that certain race-
based defenses may be more effective coming from a white lawyer:
Black attorneys who raise such [issues of race] in court often
face a heavy burden of justifying either that race really exists
as an issue at all, or that they are competent to address the
topic of race in a fair and reasoned manner. When Black
attorneys articulate racism as a primary factor in a particular
case, they may encounter fractious demands that they "prove
it," or harsh accusations that they are "playing the race card"
or otherwise engaging in unprofessional behavior .... Unlike
white attorneys, who have the relatively luxurious comfort of
invisibility and transparency in raising issues of race in the
lawyering process, Black attorneys must always brace
themselves to have their racial, professional, and personal
identities placed in issue as well.171
Professor Clark Cunningham has similarly suggested that on
racial matters, whites may impose a higher standard of proof on
Blacks making a race-based argument; that "[w]hen a white
person hears a black person use a word like 'racist,' the response is
often a strong defensive reaction that implicitly says to the black
person, 'prove it!'172 Thus, a race-based argument to a white jury
may fare better coming from a lawyer who is Caucasian rather
than from one who is African-American.
2. The "we need to talk" variant
The second variant to the Relevance Response is more
mellifluous. It is based on what has been called the Race
kind are fundamentally contrary to the social purposes of lawyering").
170. David B. Wilkins, Straightjacketing Professionalism: A Comment on
Russell, 95 MICH. L. REv. 795, 797 (1997). Wilkins goes on to say that "[w]hite
clients may also be less likely to engage the services of a black lawyer if they are
concerned that he or she will not be taken seriously by other important actors in
the system." Id.
171. Russell, supra note 11, at 771-72 (1997); see also McIntosh, supra note 130,
at 294 (listing as one of the privileges she enjoys because she is Caucasian, "[ilf I
declare there is a racial issue at hand, or there isn't a racial issue at hand, my race
will lend me more credibility for either position than a person of color will have").
172. Cunningham, supra note 8, at 1378. Cunningham was Associate Professor
of Law at Washington University when his article appeared. Id. at 1298 n.t.
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Consciousness Model of lawyering.173 This model, in contrast to
the Neutrality Model,174  posits that personal identifying
characteristics 75 such as race, gender, and ethnicity, are very
relevant to defining an attorney's abilities and effectiveness. 176
Indeed, these characteristics can be the key reason that the lawyer
is (or is not) effective. Rather than "bleaching out" these
characteristics, the Race Consciousness Model says that the
presence and effects of these characteristics need to be openly
acknowledged and discussed. Doing so will lead to greater
understanding and ultimately a better attorney-client
relationship. In sum, this model of lawyering
is based on the premise that individuals who share common
personal identity factors such as race feel an affinity for one
another that enhances communication and understanding
between them. Since communication and understanding is
vital to the attorney-client relationship, the race of both the
attorney and the client has an impact on lawyering and is a
factor that should be taken into consideration. 177
Thus, this variant of the Relevance Response says that the
white lawyer and the Black defendant should recognize the effects
race and racism will have on their relationship and, more broadly,
on the defendant's case. This means that both parties should
specifically discuss race. That discussion may obviously be
difficult and perhaps painful, but the result will be enhanced
communication and better understanding between the two. This,
in turn, will strengthen the attorney-client relationship and
thereby make the lawyer a more effective advocate. "I want to
understand and appreciate the differences between us," the lawyer
may say, "so that I can see the positive and negative effects of
those differences, and more meaningfully explain your story to the
judge/jury/prosecutor." 78
The "we need to talk" variant accordingly attempts not only
to acknowledge the concerns underlying the defendant's three
173. See Acevedo et al., supra note 5, at 3-4, 12-19.
174. See supra notes 155-162 and accompanying text.
175. Bill Hing refers to these kinds of characteristics as "personal identification
differences." See Bill 0. Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race,
Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering
Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1808 (1993); see also Acevedo et al., supra note 5,
at 3 n.7 (referring to such characteristics as "personal identity factors").
176. See Acevedo et al., supra note 5, at 3.
177. Id.
178. It is also possible that the end result of the "race discussion" between
lawyer and client is that the two agree that the defendant would be better served
by an African-American lawyer. While this is not the preferred result, it is one
that this variant must acknowledge and accept.
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arguments, but also, at least on a micro-level, to address those
concerns. In this sense, this variant is akin to Freeman's Victim
Perspective, the goal of which is to address the underlying
conditions that cause racial discrimination.1 79  Like that
perspective, the "we need to talk" variant seeks to address the
underlying problem of a fractured, racially divisive attorney-client
relationship by encouraging greater and better communications
between the parties about that problem.
But why should the defendant undertake this task? If, as the
Effectiveness and Expediency Arguments claim, a Black lawyer
can be more effective without the need for "re-tooling," then why
should a Black defendant bother with a white lawyer? There are
at least three answers to this question. First, as already noted,
the real-world practicalities are such that the appointed lawyer
and indigent defendant are stuck with each other, for better or
worse. The parties might as well opt for "better," especially given
their shared objective to win the defendant's case. Second, any
lawyer, Black or white, who successfully goes through the process
of meaningfully talking about race with his client will be a more
effective advocate on his client's behalf than a lawyer who does not
go through this process. This means that a white lawyer who is
"race conscious" because of such discussions will likely be more
effective than a Black lawyer who has not engaged in such
discussions with his client. Finally, race-conscious discussions
contemplated by the "we need to talk" variant will improve the
knowledge and understanding of white lawyers and Black
defendants, which, in turn, may contribute to justice and an
improvement in the racial discourse in society as a whole. In other
words, there is a social ethic that demands that people of different
races and ethnicities learn to get along with each other. Hence, in
contrast to the "you need a white lawyer" variant of the Relevance
Response, which perpetuates the divisiveness between the races,
the "we need to talk" variant attacks the divisiveness problem
directly, thereby furthering the Sixth Amendment's efforts at
achieving justice.
Moreover, there is empirical support to buttress the "we need
to talk" variant's claim that discussing race will benefit the
attorney-client relationship. Wilkins recently observed, for
example, that "a series of pioneering studies [have] determined
that interracial teams that openly discuss issues of race are more
likely to form long-term supportive and productive working
179. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
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relationships."'180 One of these studies examined twenty-two pairs
of cross-racial (Black-white) work relationships and found that the
junior people in these relationships who wanted to directly engage
the senior people on racial differences were more likely to obtain
greater satisfaction and benefits from those relationships when
the senior people shared the desire to directly discuss race.1 8' This
study suggests that our hypothetical Black client-white lawyer
relationship will have the greatest chance of being mutually
satisfying when both parties actively discuss racial differences.
Similarly, Professor Cynthia Estlund has noted that:
Numerous controlled studies have shown a positive
relationship between even short-term cooperative interaction
with equal-status partners and feelings of respect and liking
for the other-race individual. One recent survey of the
research concludes that "there is undoubtedly a positive
correlation, generally speaking, between reported interaction
of members of an ethnic out-group and positive or friendly
attitudes toward that group."'182
In sum, the "we need to talk" variant recommends that, to
further quote Wilkins, "lawyers... cast off the bleaching
pretensions of mainstream legal discourse and confront directly
the extent to which race and racism are thoroughly enmeshed in
legal discourse."'183
180. Wilkins, supra note 117, at 1592.
181. See Thomas, supra note 8, passim (1993). Ironically, junior and senior
people who both did not want to directly discuss race were also found to develop
more satisfying and beneficial relationships. See id. at 177, 190. This finding
points out that for the relationship to be most satisfying, both parties to it must
agree on whether racial differences will or will not be discussed. See id. Thus,
given that our hypothetical defendant wants to openly address race and racism, it
behooves our hypothetical lawyer to acknowledge the relevance of race in the
relationship.
182. Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together, The Workplace, Civil Society, and
the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 24 (2000) (citations omitted). Estlund was Professor of
Law at Columbia Law School when her article appeared. Id. at 1 n.*. She further
observes that:
A leading early theory of prejudice posited that negative stereotypes and
hostility toward other racial groups flourished in ignorance and that close
contact between members of different races improved racial understanding
and racial attitudes. Segregation was thus as much the cause as the
result of racial tension and division. Integration, and positive interracial
contacts, were the answer .... [This theory] has been tested, and has
usually been confirmed, in a large number of empirical studies using many
different methodologies--field studies, survey research, and laboratory
experiments-in a wide range of settings.
Id. at 22-24.
183. Wilkins, supra note 117, at 1520 (summarizing the view of critical race
theorists who believe that "the experiences of minority lawyers and litigants can
only be understood through the lens of the 'master narrative' of race").
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3. The "on my own" variant
The final variant of the Relevance Response is similar to the
"we need to talk" variant in that it also acknowledges the value of
understanding and appreciating the racial differences between
lawyer and client. The "on my own" variant, however, does not
recognize the need for race-conscious communications between the
two parties. Rather, this variant says that the lawyer can get
there on his own. That is, this variant claims that the lawyer is
already conscious of the racial differences and fully appreciates
the effects of those differences. The lawyer may make this claim
based on his own life experiences, including his knowledge of
racism and its effects; his experiences with other defendants; or
his conversations or other interactions with people of color. "I
understand where you are coming from," this attorney might say,
"because I have personally experienced/witnessed racism and its
effects, and I can use the knowledge acquired from that experience
on your behalf."18 4
A theme running through this and the "we need to talk"
variants is that the client should refrain from relying on
unsubstantiated assumptions that the lawyer cannot be effective
merely because he is white. Such assumptions can hinder the
development of a positive attorney-client relationship. The
defendant can ill afford such a result, the "on my own" variant
cautions, given what is at stake: the defendant's life and/or
liberty.
IV. Seeking a Resolution
The problem of an attorney-client relationship that is rife
with racial tension, as our hypothetical relationship is, cannot be
solved solely by resort to one or more of the possible attorney
responses outlined above. Below are some suggestions for
improving that relationship, including granting the indigent
defendant more say in choosing who his appointed lawyer will be.
Striving for such improvement should be the goal of every lawyer,
appointed or not. That said, some of the suggestions recognize
that sometimes the defendant's best option is to terminate the
relationship with his white lawyer and seek new appointed
counsel. 185
184. The "on my own" variant attempts to answer the claim of the Effectiveness
Argument that a white lawyer cannot be as effective as a Black one because the
former cannot understand or appreciate what it means to be a person of color.
185. In the end, an appointed lawyer must respect his client's desire to
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Addressing a Black defendant's concerns with being assigned
a white court-appointed lawyer also is important to furthering the
Sixth Amendment goal of ensuring that justice be done. As noted
previously, the concept of justice is important on both the micro-
level (for the defendant) and on the macro-level (for the judicial
system). With respect to the former, addressing the defendant's
concerns will result in better communication between lawyer and
client, which, in turn, may lead to enhanced trust and attorney
effectiveness. Improved effectiveness may not only positively
affect the outcome of the defendant's case, but it also may
contribute to the defendant's perception of fairness. This
perception is a prerequisite to the defendant believing that the
criminal justice system is legitimate and that its verdicts should
be accepted and respected both during the pendency of his case
and afterward, when he rejoins society. 186
The actuality and perception of fairness is also key to
achieving justice on the macro-level. Better communication
between lawyers and clients, which leads to improved attorney
effectiveness, means that more appropriate criminal charges will
be filed, fewer innocents will be found (or plead) guilty, and fairer
sentences will be imposed. These more just outcomes and the
perception of fairness that they engender will bolster the integrity
of the criminal justice system and the public's respect for it.
The system's integrity also will be enhanced because poor
defendants will obtain the same meaningful and effective
attorney-client relationships that defendants of means now take
for granted. Some parity will thus be restored to the appointed,
versus retained, attorney relationship. Finally, addressing an
African-American defendant's concerns with being assigned a
white lawyer will further justice beyond the criminal justice
system by improving race relations between Caucasians and
terminate the attorney-client relationship even if the former believes that decision
to be in error or not in the best interest of the defendant. See 3 LAFAVE ET AL.,
supra note 70, at 595 (stating that the attorney must abide those decisions that are
within the power of the client to make). In this context, moreover, the lawyer
should not consider what is best for society at large given his duty of fidelity and
loyalty to the client. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2000) ("A
lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client
and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.").
186. A defendant who does not respect the criminal justice system may also
choose to "opt out" of it by refusing to work with or rejecting the court-appointed
attorney. The system's typical response to such a defendant is to require him to
work with the lawyer or force the accused to represent himself with the appointed
lawyer as an advisor. These responses do not produce judgments, verdicts, or
sentences that society can deem reliable or fair. Thus, if enough defendants choose
to "opt out," the entire criminal justice system may break down.
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people of color. Such justice should be a goal of every person,
lawyer or not.
With this preamble, this Article now attempts to further the
Sixth Amendment's goal of ensuring justice by offering some
suggestions for improving our hypothetical attorney-client
relationship.
A. Promote Greater and Better Communication
The cornerstone of trust in a white attorney-Black client
relationship cannot be laid without meaningful communications
about race and racism. As the Race Consciousness Model
recommends, lawyers and clients of different races should talk
about race and its effects, if any, on the defendant's case.18 7
Ignoring those effects, per the Neutrality Model, 8 8 does not
address the underlying causes of racial tension. Dissipating that
tension will only come, as Freeman's Victim Perspective 189 says, by
directly attacking the conditions underlying that tension.
At a minimum, greater and better communication will help
sensitize the parties to the influence of race in the relationship.
As has been observed, "an attorney who is out of touch [about
personal identification differences] may be able to get by and even
achieve good results for clients. However, learning about
identification differences and understanding their potential
significance can only enhance the attorney-client relationship and
the attorney's effectiveness."'190
Such communication, however, should not be limited to the
attorney and client. The other actors in the criminal justice
system, including prosecutors, judges, and legislators, must be
sensitized to the racial concerns of indigent Black defendants.
Those actors should promote better, more honest communication
about race. 19' Indigent defendants too, should be better educated
187. See supra Part III.C.2.
188. See supra Part III.B.1.
189. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
190. Hing, supra note 175, at 1810.
191. See Alfieri, supra note 117, at 1367 ("Renewed calls for empathy in race-
infected contexts are now widely heard, even in contemporary politics .... );
Walker, supra note 101 (commenting that "[i]n general, whites and blacks are
highly conscious of race in their interactions with one another yet are unwilling to
discuss openly what this means"). Walker goes on to recommend:
More than anything, blacks and whites need to know each other as whole,
complex individuals. We need to talk about the tensions underlying our
interactions. That would be the first step in a long process of reckoning
with this nation's racist history, in order to stem its effect on the present.
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about their rights and encouraged to speak up when they have
concerns. Too often, racial issues, like the metaphorical elephant,
crowd the room without ever being acknowledged.
This deafening silence can be traced in part to the failed
Neutrality Model's ethic of bleaching out differences such as race,
gender, and ethnicity. 192  Law schools should foster race
consciousness so that students learn to be sensitive to the issue of
race and not afraid to discuss it. As some have advocated:
[L]aw schools should focus more on [racial] differences, and
more on communication skills .... Because law is taught
from a neutral perspective, we may be inhibiting white
students, who most likely have not been forced to examine
racial issues, from developing the sensitivity that may be
necessary to effectively advocate for people of color ....
Perhaps, then, the time has finally arrived for our law schools
to acknowledge that the pursuit of colorblindness is an
inadequate social policy by which to achieve justice within our
legal system. 193
Despite what the Neutrality Model believes, teaching race
consciousness will not undermine our legal system. First, race
consciousness will not result in laws being applied with any more
bias than they already are. Second, just because race and racism
are openly acknowledged and discussed does not mean that
lawyers will be any less effective. Indeed, as previously noted,
studies and common sense say just the opposite. 194 Third, race
conscious lawyering will not change the requirement that all
lawyers adhere to a specified code of ethical and professional
conduct. Lawyers, Black and white, who run afoul of ethical rules
or who are incompetent under the Strickland standard, will still
be held accountable. 195 Lastly, taking race into account will not
192. See supra Part III.B.1.
193. Acevedo et al., supra note 5, at 66; see also Hing, supra note 175, at 1830-33
(recommending that law schools teach classes and require more clinical experience
in how to be conscious of personal identification differences such as race, ethnicity,
and gender); cf. Cunningham, supra note 8, at 1378 (noting that some have
advocated for adopting a less accusatory tone in the racial discourse, and citing as
an example that whites often respond with acts of "microaggression" when accused
of being discriminatory and that in response, "scholars [have] introduce[d] a new
word, 'racialist,' to describe judgments and actions controlled by racial stereotypes
without adopting an accusatory tone").
194. See supra notes 180-182 and accompanying text.
195. While not addressing the issue of race, the Defense Function Standards of
the American Bar Association do address the issue of different model standards for
retained versus appointed counsel. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Defense Function Standard 4-1.2 cmt. (3d ed. 1993) (stating that it was not
"thought appropriate to set a different standard according to the nature of the
employment").
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diminish the legal profession's role as an instrument of minority
advancement. If anything, that role will be strengthened as race-
conscious lawyers see the need for greater diversity within the
legal profession. 196
Finally, in order to promote greater and better
communication, standards of professional conduct should be
adopted setting forth a commitment to an improved dialogue
between attorney and client on the matter of race. Such standards
as the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice
(Prosecution Function and Defense Function) and the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct are currently silent on this issue. 197
B. Accord Greater Weight to the Importance of a
Meaningful Attorney-Client Relationship
Morris v. Slappy, it will be recalled, unequivocally rejected
the view of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that a "meaningful"
attorney-client relationship is part of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel. 198 The facts of Slappy are illustrative of the lack of
control many indigent defendants have over the conduct of their
own cases.
Joseph Slappy was charged in San Francisco with the rape
and robbery of a woman walking home from the grocery store.199
Harvey Goldfine from the San Francisco Public Defender's Office
was appointed to represent Slappy, but was hospitalized shortly
before trial and thus was unable to continue with the case. 200 Six
days before the scheduled trial date, another trial attorney from
196. See Wilkins, supra note 117, at 1592 (stating that "there is substantial
evidence that, contrary to the assumptions underlying bleached out
professionalism, race consciousness, not colorblindness, is the most effective
strategy for negotiating diversity in the workplace").
197. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE passim, Defense Function
Standard 4-3.1 & cmt. (3d ed. 1993) (discussing the necessity and importance of
trust and confidence, but never mentioning race or racism as a factor in the
attorney-client relationship); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT passim, R.
2.1 (not mentioning race as a factor that a lawyer may consider when rendering
professional advice, but instead, stating that in rendering such advice, "a lawyer
may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic,
social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation"); id. at R.
8.4 cmt., para. 2 (stating that a lawyer does not engage in misconduct if he engages
in "legitimate advocacy" respecting "race, sex, religion, national origin, disability,
age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status"); cf. id. at Scope, para. 14 (noting
that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct "do not... exhaust the moral and
ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human
activity can be completely defined by legal rules").
198. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983).
199. Id. at 4-5.
200. Id. at 5.
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the Public Defender's Office, Bruce Hotchkiss, was assigned to
take over. 20 1
On the first day of trial, Slappy complained that Hotchkiss
had not had enough time to prepare his defense.202  That
complaint was rejected by the trial judge, who in the face of
Hotchkiss' representations that he was prepared, refused to
postpone the trial.20 3 Slappy renewed this complaint on the second
and third days of trial, eventually arguing to the trial court that
he was unrepresented by counsel given that his initial attorney,
Harvey Goldfine, was in the hospital.20 4 The trial judge rejected
these arguments as well, and ultimately Slappy was convicted of
all charges. 205
After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, Slappy
brought a habeas corpus action in federal court claiming, inter
alia, that the trial court erred in refusing to postpone his trial. 20 6
The district court rejected Slappy's claims, but the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel "include[s] the right to a meaningful attorney-client
relationship."207  Finding that Slappy had established such a
relationship with Goldfine, and that the trial court erred in
denying the accused's request for a continuance, the Ninth Circuit
ordered that Slappy be retried.208
The Supreme Court reversed, characterizing the Ninth
Circuit's ruling as "novel" and "without basis in the law."20 9 In so
doing, the Court too cavalierly dismissed the importance of a
meaningful attorney-client relationship, especially to indigent
defendants who have little or no choice in who their counsel will
be. In essence, the Slappy Court ignored the Sixth Amendment's
goal of achieving justice by sacrificing it on the altar of expediency.
To further that goal, greater weight should be accorded to the
importance of a meaningful lawyer-client relationship. This does
not mean that a defendant should have a constitutional right to
such a relationship or that a judge, to use the words of the
201. Id.
202. Id. at 6.
203. Id. at 6-7. Among other representations, Hotchkiss said to the trial court,
"I feel that I am prepared. My own feeling is that a further continuance would not
benefit me in presenting the case." Id. at 6.
204. Id. at 7-9.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 9-10.
207. Id. at 10-11.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 13.
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Supreme Court, has to "guarantee that a defendant will develop
[meaningful] rapport."210  It means simply that courts should
recognize the importance of such a relationship and give greater
deference thereto when called upon to assess the relations
between lawyer and client.211 In Slappy, the Court was wrong, as
Justices Brennan and Marshall in a separate opinion pointed out,
to find absolutely no merit in the Ninth Circuit's view.212
The consequence of according greater deference to the
importance of a meaningful attorney-client relationship is that an
indigent will have an easier time arguing to a trial judge that
different counsel ought to be appointed to his case. Because a
meaningful relationship is not something the Supreme Court
thinks is worth protecting, trial judges currently have no
disincentive to summarily rejecting an indigent's motion for new
appointed counsel.213 When, however, the issue of race impedes
the development of such a relationship, courts should be more
willing to appoint substitute counsel.
This means as well that new counsel should be appointed if
the defendant can make a credible showing that his appointed
lawyer will be ineffective because of the latter's race, or that a
lawyer of a different race will be markedly more effective than the
current appointed lawyer. This is not to say that a court should
relieve an appointed lawyer merely because he is white or Black.
That is a result that the legal system and society as a whole
210. Id. at 13-14 (saying that "[n]o court could possibly guarantee that a
defendant will develop the kind of rapport with his attorney... that the [Ninth
Circuit] Court of Appeals thought part of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of
counsel").
211. See, e.g., Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 721 (9th Cir. 1981) (recognizing
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel "encompasses the right to have the trial
judge accord weight to that relationship in determining whether to grant a
continuance" when the defendant's attorney is temporarily unavailable), rev'd 461
U.S. 1 (1983).
212. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 19-20, 25 (Brennan, J., joined by
Marshall, J., concurring in the result) (stating that an interest in a meaningful
attorney-client relationship "does find support in other cases" and that "[iun light of
the importance of a defendant's relationship with his attorney to his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, recognizing a qualified right to continue that
relationship is eminently sensible").
213. Currently, obtaining substitute counsel is unreasonably difficult. See supra
notes 69-76 and accompanying text; see also COOK, supra note 67, at 8-58 (noting
that a motion for new appointed counsel generally will not be successful unless "the
accused can point to particular reasons for [the] dissatisfaction"); 3 LAFAvE ET AL.,
supra note 70, at 595 n.6 (citing cases that hold that a defendant is not entitled to
substitute appointed counsel "where the disagreement with counsel relates to a
matter within the exclusive province of the lawyer"); cf. COOK, supra note 67, at 76
(Supp. 2000) (noting that "[t]he failure of a trial court to consider an accused's
complaints about appointed counsel is error").
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cannot countenance. 21 4 However, courts should be more sensitive
to the effects of personal identifying characteristics, such as race,
and grant relief to an indigent defendant who can establish a
credible link between those characteristics and the effectiveness of
his current counsel.
Paying more attention to the meaningfulness of the attorney-
client relationship will also, like Freeman's Victim Perspective
recommends, 215 address the causes underlying the racial concerns
of a Black indigent defendant. Courts would have to listen to
those concerns if the quality of the relationship were given greater
prominence than it is now. This approach also complements the
Race Consciousness Model's call for greater and better
communication. 216 Once the actors in the criminal justice system
begin talking about race, they will be more receptive to the
indigent defendant's call for a more racially meaningful attorney-
client relationship., Finally, for an indigent defendant who truly
wants to replace his lawyer, the above approach restores some of
the defendant's dignity by giving him more control over the kind of
relationship he may want to have with his lawyer.
C. Revise Procedures for Appointing Counsel
In addition to giving an indigent defendant more say in
replacing his appointed lawyer, an indigent defendant should also
be given greater say in the initial selection of his appointed
lawyer. The procedures for appointing counsel should be revised
to give the accused the option to select his own counsel. Assuming
that the chosen lawyer agrees to the appointment, that he is
conflict-free and qualified to handle the case, and that he or she is
otherwise acceptable to the court, there is no overriding reason not
214. An interesting question that is beyond the scope of this Article is whether a
defendant who rejects his appointed counsel merely because of the latter's race
violates some ethical obligation. A lawyer, of course, is prohibited from
discriminating on the basis of race. Professor Wilkins, in considering this question
in terms of gender, concluded that:
Although [the] client and every other citizen is morally (and in many cases
legally) required not to discriminate on the basis of status in their
employment decisions, there is nothing in the nature of the attorney-client
relationship that prohibits clients from seeking to obtain the services of
those lawyers whom they believe will best serve their cause. Thus, the
client's decision to take gender into account when hiring his lawyer stands
on different ethical footing than the lawyer's decision to refuse the
representation on the basis of the client's gender.
David B. Wilkins, Do Clients Have Ethical Obligations to Lawyers? Some Lessons
from the Diversity Wars, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 855, 898-99 (1998).
215. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
216. See supra Part III.C.2.
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to honor the defendant's choice. Granting the accused this
privilege will help bring some parity to the retained versus
appointed counsel selection process, give the client greater control
over the conduct of his defense, and replace some of the
defendant's dignity that the current "take it or leave it" regime
strips away.
Alternatively, the defendant could be assigned two alternate
counsel in addition to his appointed lawyer. The latter would be
responsible for meeting with the accused and representing him as
usual. However, within some reasonable period of time after the
appointment, the defendant could elect to substitute in any one of
the alternates. The initially appointed counsel would be obligated
to assist the defendant in making that decision, and the alternates
would be permitted during that time period to speak with the
accused about the case. 217 Once the final section has been made,
or the time period had expired, the de-selected lawyers would be
relieved of any further responsibility for the case.
Several scholars who have studied indigent appointments
have recognized the value in allowing the client more say in the
selection process. Professor Peter Tague, for instance, has argued
that "an indigent will receive better representation if allowed to
choose the attorney who will defend him."2 18 In observing that an
accused has significant reasons for wanting to choose his
appointed counsel, one of which is allowing for "greater
participation in structuring his defense," 219 Professor Tague
examined the justifications for the existing practice and found
those justifications wanting. 220 He even believes that there is
merit in the view that an accused has a constitutional right to
217. To ensure confidentiality, the attorney-client privilege would have to be
extended to cover these communications.
218. Peter W. Tague, An Indigent's Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 73, 85 (1974) [hereinafter Tague, An Indigent's Right] ('Despite the
evidence that an indigent will receive better representation if allowed to choose the
attorney who will defend him, the courts have refused to accede to this request.");
see also Peter W. Tague, Ensuring Able Representation For Publicly-Funded
Criminal Defendants: Lessons From England, 69 U. CINN. L. REV. 273 (2000)
(suggesting that vouchers could be used to allow an indigent defendant to choose a
private lawyer). Tague is currently Professor of Law at the Georgetown University
Law Center. See GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/index.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2001).
219. Tague, An Indigent's Right, supra note 218, at 99.
220. See id. ("[D]enying an indigent the right to choose his counsel fails to
further in any substantial way legitimate government interests, interests that can
be protected by less intrusive measures. The classification distinguishing indigent
from nonindigent should therefore fall and an indigent should have equal
opportunity to select his own counsel.").
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choose his own attorney. 221
Professors Stephen Schulhofer and David Friedman have
similarly found the current methods of appointing counsel
wanting.222 They argue that indigents should be allowed control
over the selection of appointed counsel through "deregulated
systems," including vouchers to retain private counsel. 223 "[T]he
defendant could be provided several recommendations," they
suggest, "or the name of a single attorney likely to accept
appointment. An even more cautious model would continue the
practice of having the court appoint counsel, but would advise
defendants that they can choose a substitute if they prefer."224
The end result of such systems would be an enhanced attorney-
client relationship. In their words, "[t]he mere existence of a right
to choose would dissipate some of the distrust that now infects
many involuntary attorney-client relationships and would for the
first time give the appointed attorney a self-interested reason to
value the satisfaction of his client as well as that of the court."225
221. See id. at 87, 99; see also Holly, supra note 2, at 201-19 (critiquing the
rationales for denying indigents the right to choose their own counsel and
suggesting that because indigent defendants are obligated to repay all or a portion
of the costs of their legal defense, they have a limited right to select the attorney
who is assigned to them).
222. See Schulhofer &-Friedman, supra note 70, at 106 (commenting that "[t]he
reasons given for refusing to honor defendants' choices [of appointed counsel] are in
our view insufficient"). When their article was published, Schulhofer was Bernice
J. Greenberg Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Studies in Criminal
Justice at the University of Chicago Law School, and Friedman was a Visiting
Professor at Cornell Law School. Id. at 73 n.*.
223. Id. at 77, 101.
224. Id. at 103; see also 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 70, at 551 (observing that
"[alt least two states [Georgia in capital cases and California] have departed from
[the] traditional position that allows a trial court to completely disregard the
defendant's preference for appointment of a particular counsel").
225. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 70, at 104 (emphasis in original).
Schulhofer and Friedman also believe that the officials who choose appointed
counsel may not have the best interests of the defendant at heart. They observe:
A public official who chooses for the defendant is likely to have . .. a
weaker incentive to make the best choice. Indeed... the official ... has
incentives to value cooperativeness, disinclination to work long hours, and
other qualities that might not win favor with defendants themselves.
Providers may end up being selected according to how well they serve the
court, not how well they serve defendants.
Id. at 80. The American Bar Association also encourages the practice of allowing
indigent defendants to choose their own appointed counsel. The ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice, for instance, contain this recommendation:
Neither statutes nor court decisions recognize the right of an eligible
defendant to select the private lawyer of his or her choice .... In contrast,
the defendant with sufficient funds can retain the lawyer of his or her
choice and discharge an attorney when confidence in the lawyer
diminishes. There is much to be said for allowing the eligible defendant,
when administratively feasible, the same freedom of action available to the
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In sum, fair procedures and reliable results, both components
of justice, are more likely to result if the indigent has a real voice
in deciding the composition and character of the relationship with
his appointed lawyer. The Sixth Amendment decisions and court
rules disallowing the indigent defendant any meaningful say in
selecting or replacing his appointed counsel undermine that
mandate for justice.
Conclusion
This Article has related the potential concerns an indigent
Black defendant may have when appointed a white lawyer and
some possible responses to those concerns, both by the lawyer and
the system of which the lawyer is a part. Three arguments were
identified that encapsulate those concerns: the Racism Argument,
the Effectiveness Argument, and the Expediency Argument.
Three possible responses by the lawyer, with some variants, were
also identified: the Denial or No Racism Response, the Irrelevance
Response, and the Relevance Response. Finally, strategies were
suggested for alleviating the racial friction that may arise in the
white lawyer-Black defendant relationship, including adoption of
the Race Consciousness Model's goal of discussing racial
differences.
The overarching goal of the constitutional right to counsel is
to promote the cause of justice, both for the individual defendant,
who has the right to a fair trial, and for the system of criminal
justice, which needs to produce reliable results. That goal is
undermined when a white appointed lawyer refuses to
acknowledge or adequately address the effects his and his client's
race have on their relationship. Accordingly, the appointed lawyer
and the other actors in the criminal justice system should become
more race-conscious and not only communicate better about race,
but also acknowledge and address the concerns, whether real or
perceived, that underlie an African-American defendant's
objections to being appointed a lawyer who happens to be
Caucasian.
defendant of means. Where the defendant has personally selected counsel,
there is likely to be greater confidence in the attorney and in the justness
of the legal system generally. Obviously, if all defendants insisted on the
right to choose their own attorneys, the administrative burden would
surely undermine the effectiveness of the assigned-counsel system. But
where the requests are few and do not pose serious administrative
inconvenience, selection of counsel by defendants should be encouraged.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 5-2.3 cmt. (2d ed. 1980)
(citations omitted).
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Adherents of the Neutrality Model believe that racial
differences do not matter and that they should be "bleached out" of
the attorney-client relationship. This view is not only wrong for
those defendants who believe that race matters, but it is also
dangerous, for it undermines Gideon's call for justice for all. Yet,
it is naive to believe that the viewpoint of those schooled to ignore
race and racism can be changed overnight. But, we should begin
the process. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel demands no
less.
